[img]http:// Let's see if facepunch can do this[/img]
:geno:
[img]http:// Yes facepunch CAN do this[/img]
[img]http://I am gay[/img]
nope
‬
[img]http:// Yes facepunch CAN do this[/img]
But let us discuss these matters elsewhere; an objection to what we have
said, however, may be discerned in the fact that the Platonists have not
been speaking about all goods, and that the goods that are pursued and
loved for themselves are called good by reference to a single Form, while
those which tend to produce or to preserve these somehow or to prevent
their contraries are called so by reference to these, and in a secondary
sense. Clearly, then, goods must be spoken of in two ways, and some
must be good in themselves, the others by reason of these. Let us
separate, then, things good in themselves from things useful, and consider
whether the former are called good by reference to a single Idea. What
sort of goods would one call good in themselves? Is it those that are
pursued even when isolated from others, such as intelligence, sight, and
certain pleasures and honours? Certainly, if we pursue these also for the
sake of something else, yet one would place them among things good in
themselves. Or is nothing other than the Idea of good good in itself? In
that case the Form will be empty. But if the things we have named are also
things good in themselves, the account of the good will have to appear as
something identical in them all, as that of whiteness is identical in snow
and in white lead. But of honour, wisdom, and pleasure, just in respect of
their goodness, the accounts are distinct and diverse. The good, therefore,
is not some common element answering to one Idea.
But what then do we mean by the good? It is surely not like the things that
only chance to have the same name. Are goods one, then, by being
derived from one good or by all contributing to one good, or are they rather
one by analogy? Certainly as sight is in the body, so is reason in the soul,
and so on in other cases. But perhaps these subjects had better be
dismissed for the present; for perfect precision about them would be more
appropriate to another branch of philosophy. And similarly with regard to
the Idea; even if there is some one good which is universally predicable of
goods or is capable of separate and independent existence, clearly it could
not be achieved or attained by man; but we are now seeking something
attainable. Perhaps, however, some one might think it worth while to
recognize this with a view to the goods that are attainable and achievable;
for having this as a sort of pattern we shall know better the goods that are
good for us, and if we know them shall attain them. This argument has
some plausibility, but seems to clash with the procedure of the sciences;
for all of these, though they aim at some good and seek to supply the
deficiency of it, leave on one side the knowledge of the good. Yet that all
the exponents of the arts should be ignorant of, and should not even seek,
so great an aid is not probable. It is hard, too, to see how a weaver or a
carpenter will be benefited in regard to his own craft by knowing this 'good
itself', or how the man who has viewed the Idea itself will be a better doctor
or general thereby. For a doctor seems not even to study health in this
way, but the health of man, or perhaps rather the health of a particular
man; it is individuals that he is healing. But enough of these topics.
7
Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask what it can be. It
seems different in different actions and arts; it is different in medicine, in
strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What then is the good of each?
Surely that for whose sake everything else is done. In medicine this is
health, in strategy victory, in architecture a house, in any other sphere
something else, and in every action and pursuit the end; for it is for the
sake of this that all men do whatever else they do. Therefore, if there is an
end for all that we do, this will be the good achievable by action, and if
there are more than one, these will be the goods achievable by action.
So the argument has by a different course reached the same point; but we
must try to state this even more clearly. Since there are evidently more
than one end, and we choose some of these (e.g. wealth, flutes, and in
general instruments) for the sake of something else, clearly not all ends
are final ends; but the chief good is evidently something final. Therefore, if
there is only one final end, this will be what we are seeking, and if there are
more than one, the most final of these will be what we are seeking. Now
we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is
worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is never
desirable for the sake of something else more final than the things that are
desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing, and
therefore we call final without qualification that which is always desirable in
itself and never for the sake of something else.
Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we
choose always for self and never for the sake of something else, but
honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for
themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each
of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that
by means of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no
one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than
itself.
From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems to follow;
for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by self-sufficient we
do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself, for one who lives
a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for his
friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for citizenship. But some limit
must be set to this; for if we extend our requirement to ancestors and
descendants and friends' friends we are in for an infinite series. Let us
examine this question, however, on another occasion; the self-sufficient
we now define as that which when isolated makes life desirable and
lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be; and further we think
it most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing
among others- if it were so counted it would clearly be made more
desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is
added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always
more desirable. Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, and
is the end of action.
Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a
platitude, and a clearer account of what it is still desired. This might
perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. For just
as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist, and, in general, for all things
that have a function or activity, the good and the 'well' is thought to reside
in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function. Have
the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has
man none? Is he born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in
general each of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that
man similarly has a function apart from all these? What then can this be?
Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking what is
peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth.
Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common
even to the horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active
life of the element that has a rational principle; of this, one part has such a
principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of
possessing one and exercising thought. And, as 'life of the rational
element' also has two meanings, we must state that life in the sense of
activity is what we mean; for this seems to be the more proper sense of the
term. Now if the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or
implies a rational principle, and if we say 'so-and-so-and 'a good so-and-so'
have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre, and a good
lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of
goodness being idded to the name of the function (for the function of a
lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well):
if this is the case, and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of
life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational
principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble
performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is
performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the
case, human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue,
and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and
most complete.
But we must add 'in a complete life.' For one swallow does not make a
summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not
make a man blessed and happy.
Let this serve as an outline of the good; for we must presumably first
sketch it roughly, and then later fill in the details. But it would seem that
any one is capable of carrying on and articulating what has once been well
outlined, and that time is a good discoverer or partner in such a work; to
which facts the advances of the arts are due; for any one can add what is
lacking. And we must also remember what has been said before, and not
look for precision in all things alike, but in each class of things such
precision as accords with the subject-matter, and so much as is
appropriate to the inquiry. For a carpenter and a geometer investigate the
right angle in different ways; the former does so in so far as the right angle
is useful for his work, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort of thing
it is; for he is a spectator of the truth. We must act in the same way, then,
in all other matters as well, that our main task may not be subordinated to
minor questions. Nor must we demand the cause in all matters alike; it is
enough in some cases that the fact be well established, as in the case of
the first principles; the fact is the primary thing or first principle. Now of first
principles we see some by induction, some by perception, some by a
certain habituation, and others too in other ways. But each set of principles
we must try to investigate in the natural way, and we must take pains to
state them definitely, since they have a great influence on what follows.
For the beginning is thought to be more than half of the whole, and many
of the questions we ask are cleared up by it.
8
We must consider it, however, in the light not only of our conclusion and
our premisses, but also of what is commonly said about it; for with a true
view all the data harmonize, but with a false one the facts soon clash. Now
goods have been divided into three classes, and some are described as
external, others as relating to soul or to body; we call those that relate to
soul most properly and truly goods, and psychical actions and activities we
class as relating to soul. Therefore our account must be sound, at least
according to this view, which is an old one and agreed on by philosophers.
It is correct also in that we identify the end with certain actions and
activities; for thus it falls among goods of the soul and not among external
goods. Another belief which harmonizes with our account is that the happy
man lives well and does well; for we have practically defined happiness as
a sort of good life and good action. The characteristics that are looked for
in happiness seem also, all of them, to belong to what we have defined
happiness as being. For some identify happiness with virtue, some with
practical wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic wisdom, others with
these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure;
while others include also external prosperity. Now some of these views
have been held by many men and men of old, others by a few eminent
persons; and it is not probable that either of these should be entirely
mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least some one respect
or even in most respects.
With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one virtue our
account is in harmony; for to virtue belongs virtuous activity. But it makes,
perhaps, no small difference whether we place the chief good in
possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity. For the state of mind
may exist without producing any good result, as in a man who is asleep or
in some other way quite inactive, but the activity cannot; for one who has
the activity will of necessity be acting, and acting well. And as in the
Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful and the strongest that are
crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these that are
victorious), so those who act win, and rightly win, the noble and good
things in life.
Their life is also in itself pleasant. For pleasure is a state of soul, and to
each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant; e.g. not only is
a horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a spectacle to the lover of
sights, but also in the same way just acts are pleasant to the lover of
justice and in general virtuous acts to the lover of virtue. Now for most men
their pleasures are in conflict with one another because these are not by
nature pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things
that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these
are pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature. Their life,
therefore, has no further need of pleasure as a sort of adventitious charm,
but has its pleasure in itself. For, besides what we have said, the man who
does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no one would call
a man just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal who did not
enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in all other cases. If this is so, virtuous
actions must be in themselves pleasant. But they are also good and noble,
and have each of these attributes in the highest degree, since the good
man judges well about these attributes; his judgement is such as we have
described. Happiness then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in
the world, and these attributes are not severed as in the inscription at
Delos-
Most noble is that which is justest, and best is health;
But pleasantest is it to win what we love.
For all these properties belong to the best activities; and these, or one- the
best- of these, we identify with happiness.
Yet evidently, as we said, it needs the external goods as well; for it is
impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment. In
many actions we use friends and riches and political power as instruments;
and there are some things the lack of which takes the lustre from
happiness, as good birth, goodly children, beauty; for the man who is very
ugly in appearance or ill-born or solitary and childless is not very likely to be
happy, and perhaps a man would be still less likely if he had thoroughly bad
children or friends or had lost good children or friends by death. As we
said, then, happiness seems to need this sort of prosperity in addition; for
which reason some identify happiness with good fortune, though others
identify it with virtue.
[QUOTE=Skippy!;16139314]But let us discuss these matters elsewhere; an objection to what we have
said, however, may be discerned in the fact that the Platonists have not
been speaking about all goods, and that the goods that are pursued and
loved for themselves are called good by reference to a single Form, while
those which tend to produce or to preserve these somehow or to prevent
their contraries are called so by reference to these, and in a secondary
sense. Clearly, then, goods must be spoken of in two ways, and some
must be good in themselves, the others by reason of these. Let us
separate, then, things good in themselves from things useful, and consider
whether the former are called good by reference to a single Idea. What
sort of goods would one call good in themselves? Is it those that are
pursued even when isolated from others, such as intelligence, sight, and
certain pleasures and honours? Certainly, if we pursue these also for the
sake of something else, yet one would place them among things good in
themselves. Or is nothing other than the Idea of good good in itself? In
that case the Form will be empty. But if the things we have named are also
things good in themselves, the account of the good will have to appear as
something identical in them all, as that of whiteness is identical in snow
and in white lead. But of honour, wisdom, and pleasure, just in respect of
their goodness, the accounts are distinct and diverse. The good, therefore,
is not some common element answering to one Idea.
But what then do we mean by the good? It is surely not like the things that
only chance to have the same name. Are goods one, then, by being
derived from one good or by all contributing to one good, or are they rather
one by analogy? Certainly as sight is in the body, so is reason in the soul,
and so on in other cases. But perhaps these subjects had better be
dismissed for the present; for perfect precision about them would be more
appropriate to another branch of philosophy. And similarly with regard to
the Idea; even if there is some one good which is universally predicable of
goods or is capable of separate and independent existence, clearly it could
not be achieved or attained by man; but we are now seeking something
attainable. Perhaps, however, some one might think it worth while to
recognize this with a view to the goods that are attainable and achievable;
for having this as a sort of pattern we shall know better the goods that are
good for us, and if we know them shall attain them. This argument has
some plausibility, but seems to clash with the procedure of the sciences;
for all of these, though they aim at some good and seek to supply the
deficiency of it, leave on one side the knowledge of the good. Yet that all
the exponents of the arts should be ignorant of, and should not even seek,
so great an aid is not probable. It is hard, too, to see how a weaver or a
carpenter will be benefited in regard to his own craft by knowing this 'good
itself', or how the man who has viewed the Idea itself will be a better doctor
or general thereby. For a doctor seems not even to study health in this
way, but the health of man, or perhaps rather the health of a particular
man; it is individuals that he is healing. But enough of these topics.
7
Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask what it can be. It
seems different in different actions and arts; it is different in medicine, in
strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What then is the good of each?
Surely that for whose sake everything else is done. In medicine this is
health, in strategy victory, in architecture a house, in any other sphere
something else, and in every action and pursuit the end; for it is for the
sake of this that all men do whatever else they do. Therefore, if there is an
end for all that we do, this will be the good achievable by action, and if
there are more than one, these will be the goods achievable by action.
So the argument has by a different course reached the same point; but we
must try to state this even more clearly. Since there are evidently more
than one end, and we choose some of these (e.g. wealth, flutes, and in
general instruments) for the sake of something else, clearly not all ends
are final ends; but the chief good is evidently something final. Therefore, if
there is only one final end, this will be what we are seeking, and if there are
more than one, the most final of these will be what we are seeking. Now
we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is
worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is never
desirable for the sake of something else more final than the things that are
desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing, and
therefore we call final without qualification that which is always desirable in
itself and never for the sake of something else.
Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we
choose always for self and never for the sake of something else, but
honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for
themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each
of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that
by means of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no
one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than
itself.
From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems to follow;
for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by self-sufficient we
do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself, for one who lives
a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for his
friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for citizenship. But some limit
must be set to this; for if we extend our requirement to ancestors and
descendants and friends' friends we are in for an infinite series. Let us
examine this question, however, on another occasion; the self-sufficient
we now define as that which when isolated makes life desirable and
lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be; and further we think
it most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing
among others- if it were so counted it would clearly be made more
desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is
added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always
more desirable. Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, and
is the end of action.
Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a
platitude, and a clearer account of what it is still desired. This might
perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. For just
as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist, and, in general, for all things
that have a function or activity, the good and the 'well' is thought to reside
in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function. Have
the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has
man none? Is he born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in
general each of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that
man similarly has a function apart from all these? What then can this be?
Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking what is
peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth.
Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common
even to the horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active
life of the element that has a rational principle; of this, one part has such a
principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of
possessing one and exercising thought. And, as 'life of the rational
element' also has two meanings, we must state that life in the sense of
activity is what we mean; for this seems to be the more proper sense of the
term. Now if the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or
implies a rational principle, and if we say 'so-and-so-and 'a good so-and-so'
have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre, and a good
lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of
goodness being idded to the name of the function (for the function of a
lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well):
if this is the case, and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of
life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational
principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble
performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is
performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the
case, human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue,
and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and
most complete.
But we must add 'in a complete life.' For one swallow does not make a
summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not
make a man blessed and happy.
Let this serve as an outline of the good; for we must presumably first
sketch it roughly, and then later fill in the details. But it would seem that
any one is capable of carrying on and articulating what has once been well
outlined, and that time is a good discoverer or partner in such a work; to
which facts the advances of the arts are due; for any one can add what is
lacking. And we must also remember what has been said before, and not
look for precision in all things alike, but in each class of things such
precision as accords with the subject-matter, and so much as is
appropriate to the inquiry. For a carpenter and a geometer investigate the
right angle in different ways; the former does so in so far as the right angle
is useful for his work, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort of thing
it is; for he is a spectator of the truth. We must act in the same way, then,
in all other matters as well, that our main task may not be subordinated to
minor questions. Nor must we demand the cause in all matters alike; it is
enough in some cases that the fact be well established, as in the case of
the first principles; the fact is the primary thing or first principle. Now of first
principles we see some by induction, some by perception, some by a
certain habituation, and others too in other ways. But each set of principles
we must try to investigate in the natural way, and we must take pains to
state them definitely, since they have a great influence on what follows.
For the beginning is thought to be more than half of the whole, and many
of the questions we ask are cleared up by it.
8
We must consider it, however, in the light not only of our conclusion and
our premisses, but also of what is commonly said about it; for with a true
view all the data harmonize, but with a false one the facts soon clash. Now
goods have been divided into three classes, and some are described as
external, others as relating to soul or to body; we call those that relate to
soul most properly and truly goods, and psychical actions and activities we
class as relating to soul. Therefore our account must be sound, at least
according to this view, which is an old one and agreed on by philosophers.
It is correct also in that we identify the end with certain actions and
activities; for thus it falls among goods of the soul and not among external
goods. Another belief which harmonizes with our account is that the happy
man lives well and does well; for we have practically defined happiness as
a sort of good life and good action. The characteristics that are looked for
in happiness seem also, all of them, to belong to what we have defined
happiness as being. For some identify happiness with virtue, some with
practical wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic wisdom, others with
these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure;
while others include also external prosperity. Now some of these views
have been held by many men and men of old, others by a few eminent
persons; and it is not probable that either of these should be entirely
mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least some one respect
or even in most respects.
With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one virtue our
account is in harmony; for to virtue belongs virtuous activity. But it makes,
perhaps, no small difference whether we place the chief good in
possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity. For the state of mind
may exist without producing any good result, as in a man who is asleep or
in some other way quite inactive, but the activity cannot; for one who has
the activity will of necessity be acting, and acting well. And as in the
Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful and the strongest that are
crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these that are
victorious), so those who act win, and rightly win, the noble and good
things in life.
Their life is also in itself pleasant. For pleasure is a state of soul, and to
each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant; e.g. not only is
a horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a spectacle to the lover of
sights, but also in the same way just acts are pleasant to the lover of
justice and in general virtuous acts to the lover of virtue. Now for most men
their pleasures are in conflict with one another because these are not by
nature pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things
that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these
are pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature. Their life,
therefore, has no further need of pleasure as a sort of adventitious charm,
but has its pleasure in itself. For, besides what we have said, the man who
does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no one would call
a man just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal who did not
enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in all other cases. If this is so, virtuous
actions must be in themselves pleasant. But they are also good and noble,
and have each of these attributes in the highest degree, since the good
man judges well about these attributes; his judgement is such as we have
described. Happiness then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in
the world, and these attributes are not severed as in the inscription at
Delos-
Most noble is that which is justest, and best is health;
But pleasantest is it to win what we love.
For all these properties belong to the best activities; and these, or one- the
best- of these, we identify with happiness.
Yet evidently, as we said, it needs the external goods as well; for it is
impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment. In
many actions we use friends and riches and political power as instruments;
and there are some things the lack of which takes the lustre from
happiness, as good birth, goodly children, beauty; for the man who is very
ugly in appearance or ill-born or solitary and childless is not very likely to be
happy, and perhaps a man would be still less likely if he had thoroughly bad
children or friends or had lost good children or friends by death. As we
said, then, happiness seems to need this sort of prosperity in addition; for
which reason some identify happiness with good fortune, though others
identify it with virtue.[/QUOTE]
O rly?
[img]http:// No we can't[/img]
 
[QUOTE=fille87;16139535][img]http:// No we can't[/img][/QUOTE]
[img]http://yes we can[/img]
********
[editline]06:43PM[/editline]
wadifak
:zoid:
:fappery:
[QUOTE=benzi2k7;16139984]:fappery:[/QUOTE]
You are doing it wrong
[img]http://d2k5.com/sa_emots/emot-silent.gif[/img]:fh:
|
[QUOTE=Skippy!;16139314]But let us discuss these matters elsewhere; an objection to what we have
said, however, may be discerned in the fact that the Platonists have not
been speaking about all goods, and that the goods that are pursued and
loved for themselves are called good by reference to a single Form, while
those which tend to produce or to preserve these somehow or to prevent
their contraries are called so by reference to these, and in a secondary
sense. Clearly, then, goods must be spoken of in two ways, and some
must be good in themselves, the others by reason of these. Let us
separate, then, things good in themselves from things useful, and consider
whether the former are called good by reference to a single Idea. What
sort of goods would one call good in themselves? Is it those that are
pursued even when isolated from others, such as intelligence, sight, and
certain pleasures and honours? Certainly, if we pursue these also for the
sake of something else, yet one would place them among things good in
themselves. Or is nothing other than the Idea of good good in itself? In
that case the Form will be empty. But if the things we have named are also
things good in themselves, the account of the good will have to appear as
something identical in them all, as that of whiteness is identical in snow
and in white lead. But of honour, wisdom, and pleasure, just in respect of
their goodness, the accounts are distinct and diverse. The good, therefore,
is not some common element answering to one Idea.
But what then do we mean by the good? It is surely not like the things that
only chance to have the same name. Are goods one, then, by being
derived from one good or by all contributing to one good, or are they rather
one by analogy? Certainly as sight is in the body, so is reason in the soul,
and so on in other cases. But perhaps these subjects had better be
dismissed for the present; for perfect precision about them would be more
appropriate to another branch of philosophy. And similarly with regard to
the Idea; even if there is some one good which is universally predicable of
goods or is capable of separate and independent existence, clearly it could
not be achieved or attained by man; but we are now seeking something
attainable. Perhaps, however, some one might think it worth while to
recognize this with a view to the goods that are attainable and achievable;
for having this as a sort of pattern we shall know better the goods that are
good for us, and if we know them shall attain them. This argument has
some plausibility, but seems to clash with the procedure of the sciences;
for all of these, though they aim at some good and seek to supply the
deficiency of it, leave on one side the knowledge of the good. Yet that all
the exponents of the arts should be ignorant of, and should not even seek,
so great an aid is not probable. It is hard, too, to see how a weaver or a
carpenter will be benefited in regard to his own craft by knowing this 'good
itself', or how the man who has viewed the Idea itself will be a better doctor
or general thereby. For a doctor seems not even to study health in this
way, but the health of man, or perhaps rather the health of a particular
man; it is individuals that he is healing. But enough of these topics.
7
Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask what it can be. It
seems different in different actions and arts; it is different in medicine, in
strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What then is the good of each?
Surely that for whose sake everything else is done. In medicine this is
health, in strategy victory, in architecture a house, in any other sphere
something else, and in every action and pursuit the end; for it is for the
sake of this that all men do whatever else they do. Therefore, if there is an
end for all that we do, this will be the good achievable by action, and if
there are more than one, these will be the goods achievable by action.
So the argument has by a different course reached the same point; but we
must try to state this even more clearly. Since there are evidently more
than one end, and we choose some of these (e.g. wealth, flutes, and in
general instruments) for the sake of something else, clearly not all ends
are final ends; but the chief good is evidently something final. Therefore, if
there is only one final end, this will be what we are seeking, and if there are
more than one, the most final of these will be what we are seeking. Now
we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is
worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is never
desirable for the sake of something else more final than the things that are
desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing, and
therefore we call final without qualification that which is always desirable in
itself and never for the sake of something else.
Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we
choose always for self and never for the sake of something else, but
honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for
themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each
of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that
by means of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no
one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than
itself.
From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems to follow;
for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by self-sufficient we
do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself, for one who lives
a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for his
friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for citizenship. But some limit
must be set to this; for if we extend our requirement to ancestors and
descendants and friends' friends we are in for an infinite series. Let us
examine this question, however, on another occasion; the self-sufficient
we now define as that which when isolated makes life desirable and
lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be; and further we think
it most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing
among others- if it were so counted it would clearly be made more
desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is
added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always
more desirable. Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, and
is the end of action.
Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a
platitude, and a clearer account of what it is still desired. This might
perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. For just
as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist, and, in general, for all things
that have a function or activity, the good and the 'well' is thought to reside
in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function. Have
the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has
man none? Is he born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in
general each of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that
man similarly has a function apart from all these? What then can this be?
Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking what is
peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth.
Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common
even to the horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active
life of the element that has a rational principle; of this, one part has such a
principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of
possessing one and exercising thought. And, as 'life of the rational
element' also has two meanings, we must state that life in the sense of
activity is what we mean; for this seems to be the more proper sense of the
term. Now if the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or
implies a rational principle, and if we say 'so-and-so-and 'a good so-and-so'
have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre, and a good
lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of
goodness being idded to the name of the function (for the function of a
lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well):
if this is the case, and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of
life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational
principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble
performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is
performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the
case, human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue,
and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and
most complete.
But we must add 'in a complete life.' For one swallow does not make a
summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not
make a man blessed and happy.
Let this serve as an outline of the good; for we must presumably first
sketch it roughly, and then later fill in the details. But it would seem that
any one is capable of carrying on and articulating what has once been well
outlined, and that time is a good discoverer or partner in such a work; to
which facts the advances of the arts are due; for any one can add what is
lacking. And we must also remember what has been said before, and not
look for precision in all things alike, but in each class of things such
precision as accords with the subject-matter, and so much as is
appropriate to the inquiry. For a carpenter and a geometer investigate the
right angle in different ways; the former does so in so far as the right angle
is useful for his work, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort of thing
it is; for he is a spectator of the truth. We must act in the same way, then,
in all other matters as well, that our main task may not be subordinated to
minor questions. Nor must we demand the cause in all matters alike; it is
enough in some cases that the fact be well established, as in the case of
the first principles; the fact is the primary thing or first principle. Now of first
principles we see some by induction, some by perception, some by a
certain habituation, and others too in other ways. But each set of principles
we must try to investigate in the natural way, and we must take pains to
state them definitely, since they have a great influence on what follows.
For the beginning is thought to be more than half of the whole, and many
of the questions we ask are cleared up by it.
8
We must consider it, however, in the light not only of our conclusion and
our premisses, but also of what is commonly said about it; for with a true
view all the data harmonize, but with a false one the facts soon clash. Now
goods have been divided into three classes, and some are described as
external, others as relating to soul or to body; we call those that relate to
soul most properly and truly goods, and psychical actions and activities we
class as relating to soul. Therefore our account must be sound, at least
according to this view, which is an old one and agreed on by philosophers.
It is correct also in that we identify the end with certain actions and
activities; for thus it falls among goods of the soul and not among external
goods. Another belief which harmonizes with our account is that the happy
man lives well and does well; for we have practically defined happiness as
a sort of good life and good action. The characteristics that are looked for
in happiness seem also, all of them, to belong to what we have defined
happiness as being. For some identify happiness with virtue, some with
practical wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic wisdom, others with
these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure;
while others include also external prosperity. Now some of these views
have been held by many men and men of old, others by a few eminent
persons; and it is not probable that either of these should be entirely
mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least some one respect
or even in most respects.
With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one virtue our
account is in harmony; for to virtue belongs virtuous activity. But it makes,
perhaps, no small difference whether we place the chief good in
possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity. For the state of mind
may exist without producing any good result, as in a man who is asleep or
in some other way quite inactive, but the activity cannot; for one who has
the activity will of necessity be acting, and acting well. And as in the
Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful and the strongest that are
crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these that are
victorious), so those who act win, and rightly win, the noble and good
things in life.
Their life is also in itself pleasant. For pleasure is a state of soul, and to
each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant; e.g. not only is
a horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a spectacle to the lover of
sights, but also in the same way just acts are pleasant to the lover of
justice and in general virtuous acts to the lover of virtue. Now for most men
their pleasures are in conflict with one another because these are not by
nature pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things
that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these
are pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature. Their life,
therefore, has no further need of pleasure as a sort of adventitious charm,
but has its pleasure in itself. For, besides what we have said, the man who
does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no one would call
a man just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal who did not
enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in all other cases. If this is so, virtuous
actions must be in themselves pleasant. But they are also good and noble,
and have each of these attributes in the highest degree, since the good
man judges well about these attributes; his judgement is such as we have
described. Happiness then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in
the world, and these attributes are not severed as in the inscription at
Delos-
Most noble is that which is justest, and best is health;
But pleasantest is it to win what we love.
For all these properties belong to the best activities; and these, or one- the
best- of these, we identify with happiness.
Yet evidently, as we said, it needs the external goods as well; for it is
impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment. In
many actions we use friends and riches and political power as instruments;
and there are some things the lack of which takes the lustre from
happiness, as good birth, goodly children, beauty; for the man who is very
ugly in appearance or ill-born or solitary and childless is not very likely to be
happy, and perhaps a man would be still less likely if he had thoroughly bad
children or friends or had lost good children or friends by death. As we
said, then, happiness seems to need this sort of prosperity in addition; for
which reason some identify happiness with good fortune, though others
identify it with virtue.[/QUOTE]
[QUOTE=Stosh;16139519]O rly?[/QUOTE]
Ya rly. I think so.