The Ship of Theseus - General

What are your views on the Ship of Theseus, Facepunch? First, for those of you who don't know: The Ship of Theseus is an ancient Greek problem (as the name would suggest) which has puzzled philosophers for ages. The problem is: The Ship of Theseus sails around the Mediterranean, day in day out, for several years, until some parts of the ship are a bit leaky. So the ship enters a dock to be repaired. The broken parts are taken out and replaced, then the ship sets off again. This cycle repeats and repeats, until one day, the Ship of Theseus ends up with none of the original parts. They have all been replaced. Is this still the same Ship of Theseus? This is the same problem as Trigger's Broom. Trigger has replaced his broom handle and head 21 and 17 times respectively - is it still the same broom? What I would think is that: Physically, the boat is a completely different boat, but in meaning, it is still the same. It still carries the same purpose and meaning of the Ship of Theseus - to sail around the Mediterranean. Although the physical appearance has changed, it still essentially carries the same identity and meaning. Humans completely refresh their cells about every 7 years (e.g. after 7 years, all your cells that have been produced then would have died). Are you still the same person? Extension: Somebody collects the rotting, broken parts of the original Ship of Theseus and makes it a boat. Which boat is the real Ship of Theseus? What do you think, Facepunch?

i agree, its still the same ship after cycling through new parts. as for the extension, i believe that they would both be the ship of Theseus, but one would be older and worn down, and people may view the older one as more valuable/original. But in reality they are the same thing, one just has newer parts. I have asked a similar type of question to my friends. If humans were able to teleport by means of disassembling their atoms at point A, and resembling at point B (not with the disassembled atoms, but with a set of atoms already at that location), would they still be the same person? Do YOU think YOU would see point B? or would a copy of yourself see it for you? What if you were never disassembled and you met your 'clone'? The only difference between this and your cells refreshing is that when your cells are refreshed after 7 years, your 'clone' is in the same exact spot at the same exact time as your original cells. With the teleportation scenario, imagine your clone not forming in the same exact spot as your original cells, but somewhere else.

When the first new part is added to the ship it becomes part of the ship and the broken part which it replaced is no longer part of the ship. Even when every old part has been replaced, it is still the same ship because all of the parts belong to it just as much as the original ones did. When all the old parts are made into another ship it is not the Theseus because those parts no longer belong to it.

[QUOTE=noh_mercy;44487935]i agree, its still the same ship after cycling through new parts. as for the extension, i believe that they would both be the ship of Theseus, but one would be older and worn down, and people may view the older one as more valuable/original. But in reality they are the same thing, one just has newer parts. I have asked a similar type of question to my friends. If humans were able to teleport by means of disassembling their atoms at point A, and resembling at point B (not with the disassembled atoms, but with a set of atoms already at that location), would they still be the same person? Do YOU think YOU would see point B? or would a copy of yourself see it for you? What if you were never disassembled and you met your 'clone'? The only difference between this and your cells refreshing is that when your cells are refreshed after 7 years, your 'clone' is in the same exact spot at the same exact time as your original cells. With the teleportation scenario, imagine your clone not forming in the same exact spot as your original cells, but somewhere else.[/QUOTE] In the case of the teleport, your conscious wouldn't survive the teleport, I think what makes 'you' would cease to exist, and a mirror of yourself with all your memories would be replaced at the other end, it would be impossible to tell though, because they would carry all of your memories and emotions up until the end of your conscious existence. To everybody else that person would be the same old you, but you would actually be gone.

[QUOTE=xamllew;44488656]In the case of the teleport, your conscious wouldn't survive the teleport, I think what makes 'you' would cease to exist, and a mirror of yourself with all your memories would be replaced at the other end, it would be impossible to tell though, because they would carry all of your memories and emotions up until the end of your conscious existence. To everybody else that person would be the same old you, but you would actually be gone.[/QUOTE] Your answer is very popular and I used to agree, but I don't any longer. The idea that the "new you" is physically indistinguishable from the "old you" to any experiment but it's not the same person seems very unscientific. It makes the self out to be some kind of magic. I accept the potential argument that "you" constitutes both the physical state of your body [I]and[/I] the physical state of your environment, but I think that any concept of the self that refers only to your person and not all of the environment you're in is forced to either say that the teleported you is the same person, or that consciousness involves something supernatural.

It is all a matter of definition really. Do you think that things are defined simply by the matter that they consist of? Or are they defined by the structural make up of the matter. If it is the first case, no one would die because matter won´t stop existing, it just clusters together to form other things. The circle of life. You die, your cells become fertilizer for the ground, plants grow from it, which get eaten by animals/humans. For me things are defined by the structure of the matter that they consist of. Some matter may get loose and gets replaced by other matter, but the structure itself prevails. Structure defines characteristics. A leg for example has the same basic parts like muscles, bones, skin, nerves. Just like an arm. But the difference is the structure of both. One excels at walking motions, the other excels at grabbing things. The same can be said on molecular level. Molecules may consist of the same types and amount of atoms, but their charactistics are defined by the structural layout of them. Compare carbon nanotubes to graphene. One is shaped like tubes, the other is shaped with many layers on top of each other. And yet their characteristics are different.

[QUOTE=Impact1986;44488763]It is all a matter of definition really. Do you think that things are defined simply by the matter that they consist of? Or are they defined by the structural make up of the matter. If it is the first case, no one would die because matter won´t stop existing, it just clusters together to form other things. The circle of life. You die, your cells become fertilizer for the ground, plants grow from it, which get eaten by animals/humans. For me things are defined by the structure of the matter that they consist of. Some matter may get loose and gets replaced by other matter, but the structure itself prevails. Structure defines characteristics. A leg for example has the same basic parts like muscles, bones, skin, nerves. Just like an arm. But the difference is the structure of both. One excels at walking motions, the other excels at grabbing things. The same can be said on molecular level. Molecules may consist of the same types and amount of atoms, but their charactistics are defined by the structural layout of them. Compare carbon nanotubes to graphene. One is shaped like tubes, the other is shaped with many layers on top of each other. And yet their characteristics are different.[/QUOTE] I don't think anyone would argue that the person on the other side is the same if the teleportation doesn't preserve structure. Otherwise there might not be a person at all.

[QUOTE=JohnnyMo1;44488729]Your answer is very popular and I used to agree, but I don't any longer. The idea that the "new you" is physically indistinguishable from the "old you" to any experiment but it's not the same person seems very unscientific. It makes the self out to be some kind of magic. I accept the potential argument that "you" constitutes both the physical state of your body [I]and[/I] the physical state of your environment, but I think that any concept of the self that refers only to your person and not all of the environment you're in is forced to either say that the teleported you is the same person, or that consciousness involves something supernatural.[/QUOTE] I'd say this really depends on what defines the conscious "you". It would be YOU, physically and mentally, to any outside observer, but since the exact electrical signals firing in your original brain wouldn't be there I don't believe that you'd be that person. Imagine that the teleporter malfunctioned and didn't destroy the first you in the teleport process, then would there just be two of you? Which ones eyes would you be seeing from?

I think my way of looking at it is that, when the new parts are added to repair the ship they become part of Theseus's ship, so even in the end when all the parts have changed, the ship is still Theseus's ship, but it's just had changes. I think of it one way, if you lose a leg are you still you? Broadly, yes. Does the definition of earth change everytime someone dies? Or change everytime someone is born? That's one question I think helps me answer the debate somehow.

[QUOTE=xamllew;44488926]I'd say this really depends on what defines the conscious "you". It would be YOU, physically and mentally, to any outside observer, but since the exact electrical signals firing in your original brain wouldn't be there I don't believe that you'd be that person.[/QUOTE] Why would the electrical signals not be there? The body is physically the same, and the electrical signals are a physical property. [QUOTE=xamllew;44488926]Imagine that the teleporter malfunctioned and didn't destroy the first you in the teleport process, then would there just be two of you? Which ones eyes would you be seeing from?[/QUOTE] I don't believe the second question here is well-formed, at least not if we agree that consciousness is a physical phenomenon. It implies that there is some supernatural "you" which just controls your body. I don't believe that's the case. The consciousness associated . Overall I think the self as we usually think of it is a very vague and essentially incorrect notion. I'm just a body whose strings are being pulled by physics. The question of, "Why am I me and not someone else?" is malformed, because it supposes that there is some kind of soul which could potentially have been controlling a different person and my mind did not just emerge from my body. Here's a question: Suppose we're arguing this about Bob teleporting 5 feet to his right. But what if the whole rest of the universe instead moves 5 feet to the left and Bob stays still? The situations are physically indistinct, but in that case based on what you are arguing, Bob is the same and everything else is now new. I don't agree. [editline]8th April 2014[/editline] [QUOTE=Benf199105;44489045]I think my way of looking at it is that, when the new parts are added to repair the ship they become part of Theseus's ship, so even in the end when all the parts have changed, the ship is still Theseus's ship, but it's just had changes. I think of it one way, if you lose a leg are you still you? Broadly, yes. Does the definition of earth change everytime someone dies? Or change everytime someone is born? That's one question I think helps me answer the debate somehow.[/QUOTE] I don't think your position is necessarily wrong, but I don't see how that question helps inform your argument. I think it might be better to ask whether the Earth is different every moment because new particles are traveling to/leaving it.

[QUOTE=JohnnyMo1;44489107]Why would the electrical signals not be there? The body is physically the same, and the electrical signals are a physical property. I don't believe the second question here is well-formed, at least not if we agree that consciousness is a physical phenomenon. It implies that there is some supernatural "you" which just controls your body. I don't believe that's the case. The consciousness associated . Overall I think the self as we usually think of it is a very vague and essentially incorrect notion. I'm just a body whose strings are being pulled by physics. The question of, "Why am I me and not someone else?" is malformed, because it supposes that there is some kind of soul which could potentially have been controlling a different person and my mind did not just emerge from my body. Here's a question: Suppose we're arguing this about Bob teleporting 5 feet to his right. But what if the whole rest of the universe instead moves 5 feet to the left and Bob stays still? The situations are physically indistinct, but in that case based on what you are arguing, Bob is the same and everything else is now new. I don't agree. [editline]8th April 2014[/editline] I don't think your position is necessarily wrong, but I don't see how that question helps inform your argument. I think it might be better to ask whether the Earth is different every moment because new particles are traveling to/leaving it.[/QUOTE] I think I'm somewhat of a Wittgenstein-ien if that's even a word. I'm almost trying to say, does the definition of the earth at the current moment say it was "planet orbiting the sun, part of a solar system of X planets, X meteors, X moons, and inhabited by X million species of animals etc etc ad nauseum... does that change when someone dies or someone is born. Is the Earth that existed 1,000 years ago, home to less people, more green space, less cities, etc is that world defined differently now because of those changes in the composition of Earth? I feel like if you think Theseus's ship is a different entity then you are almost arguing that the composition of an "X" defines that X and thus any change in the micro or macro composition of that X changes it's entire definition. So every time someone dies we'd have to redefine what the world is. I'm not convinced of my own argument but I think it makes an iota of sense, not much more though. Edit: Broadly, the composition of a thing is secondary to it's perceived structure and linguistic use in terms of it's definition. I think Theseus's ship dilema is a linguistic problem more than anything.

[QUOTE=Benf199105;44489175]I think I'm somewhat of a Wittgenstein-ien if that's even a word. I'm almost trying to say, does the definition of the earth at the current moment say it was "planet orbiting the sun, part of a solar system of X planets, X meteors, X moons, and inhabited by X million species of animals etc etc ad nauseum... does that change when someone dies or someone is born. Is the Earth that existed 1,000 years ago, home to less people, is that world defined differently. I feel like if you think Theseus's ship is a different entity then you are almost arguing that the composition of an "X" defines that X and thus any change in the micro or macro composition of that X changes it's entire definition. So every time someone dies we'd have to redefine what the world is. I'm not convinced of my own argument but I think it makes an iota of sense, not much more though.[/QUOTE] I don't think your claim about arguing that the ship is a different entity means an object must change when its composition changes is necessarily accurate. In the case of the ship, the replacement parts are from outside the original system, but the dying of a person on the earth is just a change of configuration of the Earth itself. Certainly you can move parts around on a ship and still consider it the same ship?

[QUOTE=JohnnyMo1;44489245]I don't think your claim about arguing that the ship is a different entity means an object must change when its composition changes is necessarily accurate. In the case of the ship, the replacement parts are from outside the original system, but the dying of a person on the earth is just a change of configuration of the Earth itself. Certainly you can move parts around on a ship and still consider it the same ship?[/QUOTE] I would argue the "original system" argument doesn't work. The ship is a composition of atoms and thus at the molecular level it doesn't matter that the wood for the new rudder is from Turkey rather than Greece. Essentially a change in the composition of the ship is a change of the composition of all things, in essence, reality changes when we change the ship, do we argue and say that Theseus's ship is no longer Theseus's ship and that the Earth is no longer Earth as we chopped down another tree for the new mast? This is probably circular and not adding anything to what I think the actual question is about, which is more along the lines of, is there some intrinsic essence to an object's existence that when removed means the object changes; Ergo, is a key a key if the lock it opens is destroyed? I want to say it is no longer a key, but I think the fact that it was once a key is a fact about it's existence that cannot be changed even if the lock is destroyed, as in, it's use and creation stemmed from an intrinsic need to be used to open a lock, so even if the lock is destroyed, it is different from a piece of metal that is crafted to be a decorative key shaped piece of metal say.

in regards to the "teleported body of theseus" idea if the teleporter sends information to be used as a blueprint for the construction of a new person and the original is destroyed, the end result is a new person. they're a new person with identical thoughts, memories, and mental tendencies as the original, but they're a new being. the equivalent would be a clone, who was grown to the same relative age, then implanted with the mental information from an original, and awakened at the moment their source was destroyed. i guess i'd say that i'm not a functionalist, but i believe our individual consciousnesses, or our minds, are dependent on our physical brains. ours and nobody else's. 1 mind per 1 brain. to the universe, yes, that teleported copy would be functionally identical to the original (unless you wanted to somehow track each atom in the universe and separate out the atoms that make up the source vs. the copy), and even to the copy, he/she would probably also feel that they were just teleported. but, on an atomic level, it's different.

Objectively it is not well defined whether the boat is the same or different after having all its components replaced, as it depends on your subjective definition of "same". If you define "same" to mean superficially indistinguishable to an observer, it is the same. If you define "same" to mean an isomorphism of its component fundamental elements, it is not. If you define "same" to mean there is an unbroken transitive chain between the current components and the original components involving the subjectively defined symmetric and reflexive relationship of being part of the same vessel at some moment in time, it is the same. Which definition of "same" is the one we should use? Objectively there is no "correct" definition, but we can analyse each case subjectively to arrive at a subjective answer. The same applies for the cloning of consciousness (assuming consciousness involves no supernatural components). Objectively it is undefined whether the new instance of a mind is the same as the old one, but I would argue the only definition that matters for us is the "superficially indistinguishable" one. The new mind would believe it is the same as the original as it has an apparently continuous stream of memories from some moment before the cloning up to the current observer moment, and all external observers would believe the new mind is also the same as the original as it would act in an indistinguishable way. No distinctions between the two consciousness instances exist that lead to the objective conclusion that the two minds are not the same (because "sameness" is a subjective concept), and so only subjective distinctions apply. In essence, it is up to the participant and observers to decide whether a consciousness cloning event is successful or not. The universe does not make an objective judgement outside of our minds, and does not have the capacity to make such a judgement.

[QUOTE=Ziks;44489457]Objectively it is not well defined whether the boat is the same or different after having all its components replaced, as it depends on your subjective definition of "same". If you define "same" to mean superficially indistinguishable to an observer, it is the same. If you define "same" to mean an isomorphism of its component fundamental elements, it is not. If you define "same" to mean there is an unbroken transitive chain between the current components and the original components involving the subjectively defined symmetric and reflexive relationship of being part of the same vessel at some moment in time, it is the same. Which definition of "same" is the one we should use? Objectively there is no "correct" definition, but we can analyse each case subjectively to arrive at a subjective answer. The same applies for the cloning of consciousness (assuming consciousness involves no supernatural components). Objectively it is undefined whether the new instance of a mind is the same as the old one, but I would argue the only definition that matters for us is the "superficially indistinguishable" one. The new mind would believe it is the same as the original as it has an apparently continuous stream of memories from some moment before the cloning up to the current observer moment, and all external observers would believe the new mind is also the same as the original as it would act in an indistinguishable way. No distinctions between the two consciousness instances exist that lead to the objective conclusion that the two minds are not the same (because "sameness" is a subjective concept), and so only subjective distinctions apply. In essence, it is up to the participant and observers to decide whether a consciousness cloning event is successful or not. The universe does not make an objective judgement outside of our minds, and does not have the capacity to make such a judgement.[/QUOTE] well 'we' are bits an pieces that form the universe, so if you say the universe doesn't really have that capacity to make judgement 'x' thats not entirely accurate. and saying that only part of the universe can make judgements makes even less sense, the universe is everything. so if the universe is going to be brought into this, there is no longer a participant and observer, no judgments being made, just a plethora of atomic processes following the path of least resistance.

[QUOTE=noh_mercy;44489686]well 'we' are bits an pieces that form the universe, so if you say the universe doesn't really have that capacity to make judgement 'x' thats not entirely accurate. and saying that only part of the universe can make judgements makes even less sense, the universe is everything. so if the universe is going to be brought into this, there is no longer a participant and observer, no judgments being made, just a plethora of atomic processes following the path of least resistance.[/QUOTE] I'm pretty sure I covered all my bases there. I said specifically: [QUOTE]The universe does not make an objective judgement [B]outside of our minds[/B], and does not have the capacity to make such a judgement.[/QUOTE] Which is the same as saying that it is defined subjectively.

[QUOTE=Ziks;44489749]I'm pretty sure I covered all my bases there. I said specifically: Which is the same as saying that it is defined subjectively.[/QUOTE] O. I just didn't know what you meant by 'outside of our minds'.

Honestly, the answer is both. a) The human defined concept, which is seperated out - the ship of theseus remains the same even if you exchange it's constituent parts but maintain it's identity. b) The physical object itself (also actually human defined but I digress) does not. It changes and is replaced by changing it's nature and constituent parts. The thing is, as a rule, we generally see most objects under the first definition, for us to consider them under the second, they have to be incredibly special that changing their nature strongly modifies it's worth. (like old paintings which might not get repaired)

[QUOTE=JohnnyMo1;44489107]Why would the electrical signals not be there? The body is physically the same, and the electrical signals are a physical property.[/QUOTE] I think in reference to this comment [QUOTE=xamllew;44488926]I'd say this really depends on what defines the conscious "you". It would be YOU, physically and mentally, to any outside observer, but since the exact electrical signals firing in your original brain wouldn't be there I don't believe that you'd be that person. Imagine that the teleporter malfunctioned and didn't destroy the first you in the teleport process, then would there just be two of you? Which ones eyes would you be seeing from?[/QUOTE] It should be considered what the outcome of a duplication of self is rather than a transportation. If you believe making a duplicate version of yourself creates two yous, then you have to at least consider that after time goes by, the two copies will become 2 individuals as they grow and experience things. I personally don't believe that this form of transportation would preserve self. I could go my entire life without knowing identical copies of myself exist, which to me suggests transportation would not preserve consciousness.

To be clear, it really matters what you mean by teleportation. There is the "beam me up scotty", where its a scan/reconstruction, most likely even using other atoms. There is also travel fast enough to be considered teleportation, wormholes etc. Reconstruction and the self could be debated, but I don't see any argument against the preservation of self with near instant travel.

[QUOTE=PyromanDan;44491717]To be clear, it really matters what you mean by teleportation. There is the "beam me up scotty", where its a scan/reconstruction, most likely even using other atoms. There is also travel fast enough to be considered teleportation, wormholes etc. Reconstruction and the self could be debated, but I don't see any argument against the preservation of self with near instant travel.[/QUOTE] I'm under the assumption that by teleport it's referring to transport from one spot to the other without any physical travel between the two points. Otherwise it'd seem kind of tangent from the point of this thread

[QUOTE=Rofl my Waff;44491351]I think in reference to this comment It should be considered what the outcome of a duplication of self is rather than a transportation. If you believe making a duplicate version of yourself creates two yous, then you have to at least consider that after time goes by, the two copies will become 2 individuals as they grow and experience things. I personally don't believe that this form of transportation would preserve self. I could go my entire life without knowing identical copies of myself exist, which to me suggests transportation would not preserve consciousness.[/QUOTE] I think it creates two people, and neither one has a better claim to being "the original." Though if one of them moves, you can obviously single out the one which didn't go anywhere (if such a one exists) but that doesn't mean it's the true person, necessarily. Of course transportation preserves consciousness: a conscious person goes in, and a conscious person whose body is of the same configuration comes out. Asking which one you would control doesn't make much sense. "You" are just a mind attached to of one of the bodies. I could ask the person who teleported, "Did your consciousness stay with you," and they'd say, "Of course!" There's no reason their answer is wrong. Nothing makes your consciousness supernatural or unique in any way. You can't check the serial number. Even if it's a duplication, you both have the same memories and the same mind. No one has a better claim than the other. Incidentally, I think The Prestige deals with this very well. Spoilers for that movie if you haven't seen it: [sp]Angier says, "It took real courage for me to walk into that machine every night, not knowing if I was going to be the man in the box or the prestige." Of course this question is basically just an illusion. He's always the one in the prestige, because that's the only one which survives. Their memories are identical. To him it seemed like he miraculously went into the machine every night and by an incredible feat of luck he made it through every time, but that's only because one of them made it through and they all have the same memories. There's no distinction between each clone except that they end in in different positions and evolve in different ways.[/sp]

Let's define a stream of consciousness as a series of observer moments, where each observer moment describes what the individual is experiencing at some point in time (which is a collection of percepts and whatever memories are being accessed). I'd argue that the stream is continuous if each observer moment seamlessly continues on from the previous one; so a subset percepts experienced in the previous observer moment are available as memories in the following moment, and a subset of memories from the previous moment persist into the following one also. Unless you believe in some kind of supernatural soul there shouldn't be any other requirements for a stream of consciousness to feel subjectively consistent for an individual. The definition I gave above only talks about the manipulation of information involved in consciousness, and I don't see any reason why the particular medium that implements those manipulations would have any effect. As long as the same processes take place (the same operations are performed on the same information) an isomorphic set of observer moments would arise. You could interrupt the process, transfer it to a new medium, resume the process again, and as long as the operations performed thereafter are isomorphic to the ones that would have been performed on the original medium the consciousness involved would subjectively feel uninterrupted.

[QUOTE=JohnnyMo1;44491838]I think it creates two people, and neither one has a better claim to being "the original." Though if one of them moves, you can obviously single out the one which didn't go anywhere (if such a one exists) but that doesn't mean it's the true person, necessarily. Of course transportation preserves consciousness: a conscious person goes in, and a conscious person whose body is of the same configuration comes out. Asking which one you would control doesn't make much sense. "You" are just a mind attached to of one of the bodies. I could ask the person who teleported, "Did your consciousness stay with you," and they'd say, "Of course!" There's no reason their answer is wrong. Nothing makes your consciousness supernatural or unique in any way. You can't check the serial number. Even if it's a duplication, you both have the same memories and the same mind. No one has a better claim than the other. Incidentally, I think The Prestige deals with this very well. Spoilers for that movie if you haven't seen it: [sp]Angier says, "It took real courage for me to walk into that machine every night, not knowing if I was going to be the man in the box or the prestige." Of course this question is basically just an illusion. He's always the one in the prestige, because that's the only one which survives. Their memories are identical. To him it seemed like he miraculously went into the machine every night and by an incredible feat of luck he made it through every time, but that's only because one of them made it through and they all have the same memories. There's no distinction between each clone except that they end in in different positions and evolve in different ways.[/sp][/QUOTE] In my opinion who claims to be the original is completely irrelevant. I don't think I am giving consciousness any kind of special quality. [quote]"You" are just a mind attached to of one of the bodies. [/quote] Exactly, I think this is where my interpretation of self ends. I don't attribute anything about consciousness to be supernatural or special or unique. I do believe that because of my position in the universe and the continuation of the electrical signals in my body and the continuation of life processes in this particular body, my consciousness in my body is who I am and transportation would not effectively transfer that. Like I said, there can be two of me, they can be completely identical, and you can even argue that I'm not the original (and the clone can even argue that point validly as well) but to me I am the original (to him he is the original) and therefore I wouldn't consider transportation viable method of transportation I understand that by removing the clone idea I am essentially saying that I would believe that I am the original and I would be correct, but I don't believe that the continuous consciousness that took place in the original being would be preserved across time and space. I would essentially consider myself dead, which is fine I suppose.

[QUOTE=Rofl my Waff;44491990]In my opinion who claims to be the original is completely irrelevant. I don't think I am giving consciousness any kind of special quality. Exactly, I think this is where my interpretation of self ends. I don't attribute anything about consciousness to be supernatural or special or unique. I do believe that because of my position in the universe and the continuation of the electrical signals in my body and the continuation of life processes in this particular body, my consciousness in my body is who I am and transportation would not effectively transfer that. Like I said, there can be two of me, they can be completely identical, and you can even argue that I'm not the original (and the clone can even argue that point validly as well) but to me I am the original (to him he is the original) and therefore I wouldn't consider transportation viable method of transportation I understand that by removing the clone idea I am essentially saying that I would believe that I am the original and I would be correct, but I don't believe that the continuous consciousness that took place in the original being would be preserved across time and space. I would essentially consider myself dead, which is fine I suppose.[/QUOTE] I don't see that continuity of consciousness is necessary. You have a conscious body with the memories of the person who was teleported. I can't see a physical distinction from the scenario I mentioned earlier, where every particle is moved instead of the person. The universe can't tell whether the person or everything else is discontinuous. As for the statement in your 4th paragraph that you consciousness depends on your position in the environment (which does handle the duplication problem, they're definitely two different people in that case), unless I'm interpreting what you said incorrectly, I addressed it in my first post in the thread: [QUOTE=JohnnyMo1;44488729]I accept the potential argument that "you" constitutes both the physical state of your body [I]and[/I] the physical state of your environment, but I think that any concept of the self that refers only to your person and not all of the environment you're in is forced to either say that the teleported you is the same person, or that consciousness involves something supernatural.[/QUOTE]

Maybe there is a misunderstanding. [quote]You have a conscious body with the memories of the person who was teleported. I can't see a physical distinction from the scenario I mentioned earlier, where every particle is moved instead of the person.[/quote] Based on the context of the ship of Theseus, my interpretation of teleportation in the context of the thread is that individual particles from my body are removed and different particles of the same material are built in a different location in space. That being the definition of teleportation at hand, I don't see any distinction between teleportation and duplication (teleportation just involves killing the duplicate). If we consider this, and consider the fact that infinite copies of yourself at this very second could be created in random spots throughout the universe, then it is my opinion that teleportation (in the context of the ship of Theseus) would not result in the desired result of transferring you to a new location. Although, like I previously stated, if your definition of you only involves your consciousness (which in my opinion is actually more supernatural than defining it the way I previously did) then it is fine and you will live on and the person on the other end by all rights will live on as you.

You seem to be saying that if the definition of "you" involves only yourself and not your environment, then I am correct and you live through teleportation. I am saying that if your definition of "you" involves your environment and not only yourself, then you are correct and you do not survive through teleportation. I think we may secretly be in agreement.

How I see it is, given you only replace one component at a time and not the whole, every time you replace a component you make an observation before and after the change. So before the change, you identify the boat as whatever it is called, such as R805. After the change, do you still identify the boat as being the same entity, as R805? If this process is repeated every time a component is replaced, you would always identify it as R805, even if eventually all original components had been replaced.

[QUOTE=JohnnyMo1;44493177]You seem to be saying that if the definition of "you" involves only yourself and not your environment, then I am correct and you live through teleportation. I am saying that if your definition of "you" involves your environment and not only yourself, then you are correct and you do not survive through teleportation. I think we may secretly be in agreement.[/QUOTE] I think we might be, I'll concede that my interpretation of consciousness might not be the right one or it might be superficial. I went through a pretty depressed phase thinking about mortality on a regular basis and prospects of cloning for eternal life. Every simulation I ran in my head seemed to end with a black wall of unconsciousness though. But that is with the limitations of the human mind and a society that places a lot of value on the individual. For what I would want to use duplication for (eternal life) I don't see it working, and projecting it to teleportation I wouldn't want to use it as based on what I can tell would ultimately kill me.