• Is free will possible, or are we always affect by some level of determinism
    354 replies, posted
Just saying we can be intelligent about that choice is categorically claiming that is true, but I've yet to see how you've proved we have such capability.
[QUOTE=HumanAbyss;43746503] I know you want to label things the way you do for us to best understand it, but frankly I perfectly understand what is meant in both versions of the phrasing.[/QUOTE] Could you please show which premises are false or what doesn't follow in my argument? [editline]1st February 2014[/editline] [QUOTE=HumanAbyss;43746521]Just saying we can be intelligent about that choice is categorically claiming that is true, but I've yet to see how you've proved we have such capability.[/QUOTE] I think my argument provides good grounds for free will in the incompatabilist sense. I showed it to my profs and they couldn't find anything to actually attack my argument with. It covers the gap between variables and events. [editline]1st February 2014[/editline] [QUOTE=HumanAbyss;43746521]Just saying we can be intelligent about that choice is categorically claiming that is true, but I've yet to see how you've proved we have such capability.[/QUOTE] Ok let me back up here. Define "We", or even "I".
I can't really see a problem with Zenreon117 defining free will in the way he does (influence by internal random variables) and it may well apply to us, but it is kind of a weak definition in that it applies to so many entities. I'm actually struggling to think of an entity that it doesn't apply to, given that even individual photons have free will under that definition.
The two words 'free' and 'will' look odd together. Will by default is free -- just saying that is weird...
I'm not sure if this proves your post or anything but the fact that you posted this thread already prove that you have some will? And also, it depends on how you define "freewill".
[QUOTE=Ziks;43747450]I can't really see a problem with Zenreon117 defining free will in the way he does (influence by internal random variables) and it may well apply to us, but it is kind of a weak definition in that it applies to so many entities. I'm actually struggling to think of an entity that it doesn't apply to, given that even individual photons have free will under that definition.[/QUOTE] and that's why it's a bad definition of free will. it's something excercised not by beings with a will or conciousness of any sort, but by any object that has possibility for deviation. This should be called deviation. Not free will.
[QUOTE=Ziks;43747450]I can't really see a problem with Zenreon117 defining free will in the way he does (influence by internal random variables) and it may well apply to us, but it is kind of a weak definition in that it applies to so many entities. I'm actually struggling to think of an entity that it doesn't apply to, given that even individual photons have free will under that definition.[/QUOTE] Free will can only apply to the macroscopic scale of human phenomenological decision making. Particles may be free, but they haven't a will.
[QUOTE=Zenreon117;43750796]Free will can only apply to the macroscopic scale of human phenomenological decision making. Particles may be free, but they haven't a will.[/QUOTE] Can you explicitly define exactly where the distinction occurs?
[QUOTE=HumanAbyss;43749488]and that's why it's a bad definition of free will. it's something excercised not by beings with a will or conciousness of any sort, but by any object that has possibility for deviation. This should be called deviation. Not free will.[/QUOTE] Why exactly shouldn't it be by beings with a will or consciousness? If you are talking about deviation of a particle then we refer to that as just a variable, but when we talk about potential deviation in decision making, that is when we enter into the realm of free will. Do all my individual neurons have free will by themselves? No. Do they, put together into this macroscopic being you refer to as Zenreon, have free will? Yes, because it is a system that can produce multiple potential human decisions (events), and is indeterminate to a degree. What are we referring to when we talk about free will other than the ability for someone to do otherwise? [editline]1st February 2014[/editline] [QUOTE=Ziks;43750814]Can you explicitly define exactly where the distinction occurs?[/QUOTE] Well it's really more of an ontological issue. That which is me must have free will. I am not simply my hand, nor am I simply my eyes. For this reason I am neither simply part of my brain. When reffering to me it only makes sense to talk about the whole package. The whole system. If you are to isolate a neuron in my brain and put in a dish with electrodes (I know the analogy is crude), and you could show that given an input it only has a certain output, you have only shown this cell to not have free will or indeterminacy. You cannot point to this part of the system and take free-will judgments from it the same as you can't look at a member in a team and conclude that the team cannot accomplish a task because the individual member cannot do it by himself. Essentially, I am constituent of the various determinate and indeterminate functions that make up the brain. Since the indeterminacy allows me to be consciously indeterminate, and Free-will is the ability for someone to act indeterminately (Causa sui), then I conclude that I have it.
[QUOTE=Zenreon117;43750861]Why exactly shouldn't it be by beings with a will or consciousness? If you are talking about deviation of a particle then we refer to that as just a variable, but when we talk about potential deviation in decision making, that is when we enter into the realm of free will. Do all my individual neurons have free will by themselves? No. Do they, put together into this macroscopic being you refer to as Zenreon, have free will? Yes, because it is a system that can produce multiple potential human decisions (events), and is indeterminate to a degree. What are we referring to when we talk about free will other than the ability for someone to do otherwise? [editline]1st February 2014[/editline] Well it's really more of an ontological issue. That which is me must have free will. I am not simply my hand, nor am I simply my eyes. For this reason I am neither simply part of my brain. When reffering to me it only makes sense to talk about the whole package. The whole system. If you are to isolate a neuron in my brain and put in a dish with electrodes (I know the analogy is crude), and you could show that given an input it only has a certain output, you have only shown this cell to not have free will or indeterminacy. You cannot point to this part of the system and take free-will judgments from it the same as you can't look at a member in a team and conclude that the team cannot accomplish a task because the individual member cannot do it by himself. Essentially, I am constituent of the various determinate and indeterminate functions that make up the brain. Since the indeterminacy allows me to be consciously indeterminate, and Free-will is the ability for someone to act indeterminately (Causa sui), then I conclude that I have it.[/QUOTE] My problem here is that you haven't really defined what you mean by indeterminate. I think it's an important thing as your argument rests on the idea that there are indeterminite elements of the mind. I just don't know if there are. I can't claim there are not, I don't think there are, but I can't really be sure of that. I want know what you mean by interdeminates. The other problem I have is that you admit you are just a system of smaller parts working together to create a whole, but you're drawing that fact into the world of wills through just your own existence. Our thoughts may feel free, but that may be an illusion. Our actions may feel our own, but that may be an illusion. Functioning on the principle of a deterministic world, knowing that all things being equal, rules are being followed and my existence is only through this. So when I'm presented with the idea that my existence may be an illusion, following with the former principles laid out by determinism, I know that as far as I can tell, it is actually a very clever illusion. Does this knowledge make my existence more difficult? Not really. Nor does it bother me or make my ontological assessments of things any more difficult.
[QUOTE=HumanAbyss;43751078]My problem here is that you haven't really defined what you mean by indeterminate. I think it's an important thing as your argument rests on the idea that there are indeterminite elements of the mind. I just don't know if there are. I can't claim there are not, I don't think there are, but I can't really be sure of that. I want know what you mean by interdeminates. [/QUOTE] An indeterminate is something which has no reason for it to be the way it is. It is a causa sui, a first cause, and it could have gone many other potential ways. Since I am postulating that there ARE indeterminate elements in existence which affect events, and human actions are events, then this indeterminacy bubbles up into the macro-scopic scale where we talk about persons having free will. It isn't to deny the functioning of the individual parts, but to speak of the system differently than with the parts. [editline]1st February 2014[/editline] The reason we speak of the system differently than the parts is because the system has properties such as reason, identity, and a strong phenomenological experience. If the whole system is what can potentially have free will, and the whole system can potentially produce different results, and the ability to produce different results is the crux of free will, then we have it.
I don't see any reason to ascribe a "will" meaningfully to anything if we accept that he mind is completely dictated by the physics of the body. What sense is there in saying a person "wills" something if the mind is simply the result of a collection of particles? So if we ascribe "free will" to that because it is indeterminate, how is it distinct from the indeterminacy of the motion of a particle in any meaningful way? If one, why not the other? It's nothing but a sum of parts.
[QUOTE=JohnnyMo1;43752311]I don't see any reason to ascribe a "will" meaningfully to anything if we accept that he mind is completely dictated by the physics of the body. What sense is there in saying a person "wills" something if the mind is simply the result of a collection of particles? So if we ascribe "free will" to that because it is indeterminate, how is it distinct from the indeterminacy of the motion of a particle in any meaningful way? If one, why not the other? It's nothing but a sum of parts.[/QUOTE] For the same reason you can say the universe is infinite, but particles are not. Properties don't always scale, particles can't have free will just as surely as humans can't be down-spin or up-spin or positive or negative. Properties are given to the systems at the scale which it makes sense to apply them at. I will ask you what I asked earlier; Define "I". (What is personal identity, where does it start, where does it end?)
[QUOTE=Zenreon117;43752465]I will ask you what I asked earlier; Define "I". (What is personal identity, where does it start, where does it end?)[/QUOTE] It's difficult to find a sound definition since perception of self is such a subjective human construct. It's one of those things that we intuitively feel is important but can't properly describe. I'd make an attempt by defining myself as the system that has produced my particular stream of conscious memories, or at least that's what I consider to be the important part. I'd be happy to call any entity that continues on from this stream of memories in a way indistinguishable from what is produced by my current physical self "me" too.
[QUOTE=Ziks;43752584]It's difficult to find a sound definition since perception of self is such a subjective human construct. It's one of those things that we intuitively feel is important but can't properly describe. I'd make an attempt by defining myself as the system that has produced my particular stream of conscious memories, or at least that's what I consider to be the important part. I'd be happy to call any entity that continues on from this stream of memories in a way indistinguishable from what is produced by my current physical self "me" too.[/QUOTE] So if that, which is you, can ,without appeal to external systems, produce indeterminate action. Then that is free will. It is the entity which is defined as a self being able to produce externally indeterminate action, and thereby produce a free expression of it's "Will". If you define "I" as starting and ending with the processes which govern your behaviour, and those processes are indeterminate, then you too are indeterminate. What else could we be possibly talking about when we say "Free will exists". If you want to be difficult, you could say "Free will only exists if there is a complicated system known as the self that exists outside of [B]any[/B] causal relation to matter". But I think that is poppy-cock and being completely unreasonable. Although to take this stance would be to reject your definition of self, since it would be separating yourself from your brain, as if they are two different things. [editline]1st February 2014[/editline] I mean after all, free will or not, we still have to deal with things like pain and circumstance. We can't just free-will ourselves to Hawaii instantly, we would need to follow the proper course of physical motion.
why is action defined by oneself defined as indeterminate? because we can't readily see the future outcome of that calculation?
[QUOTE=HumanAbyss;43752706]why is action defined by oneself defined as indeterminate? because we can't readily see the future outcome of that calculation?[/QUOTE] The word indeterminate means that you cannot determinate it. It means that appeal to previous events needn't always necessarily give you grounds for predicting future events.
If I had complete free will, I could imagine a color that I've never seen.
[QUOTE=Zenreon117;43752726]The word indeterminate means that you cannot determinate it. It means that appeal to previous events needn't always necessarily give you grounds for predicting future events.[/QUOTE] so then it doesn't work in a deterministic universe? I don't believe that things being causal always allows us to understand them, but I don't think it makes sense to say our brains operate on a system that exists independent of that. I don't know how to come to terms with the idea we have indeterminate functions in our brains when all our brains are is determined functions of a limited scope leading to more complicated events.
[QUOTE=HumanAbyss;43752804]so then it doesn't work in a deterministic universe? I don't believe that things being causal always allows us to understand them, but I don't think it makes sense to say our brains operate on a system that exists independent of that. I don't know how to come to terms with the idea we have indeterminate functions in our brains when all our brains are is determined functions of a limited scope leading to more complicated events.[/QUOTE] Refer back to premise one of my argument; "If there are any random workings in the universe, then events have a possibility of turning out differently"
yeah but randomness doesn't give us choice nor does the appearance of randomness represent choice. in a chaotic system, random may not be random just due to the inability to understand it.
I am presented with a choice: Do, or do not pick up the card in front of me on my desk. It does not matter what I choose. In either case there was a reason behind my choice. That reason doesn't have to be obvious to exist. It could be because of my mood at the time influencing my decision on a subconscious level, which is in turn based on my personality, which is in turn based on events both during and before my life. Making the distinction of free will does not matter in regards to science. There is always a cause and effect for every action. Free will is simply a social concept. But everything we do is predetermined.
[video=youtube;L_LKzEqlPto]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L_LKzEqlPto[/video] Stanford Prison Experiment The one guy went on a hunger strike until he was released. The others didn't show as much free will and actually sided with the prison guards. I think this shows that free will is possible, though scarce.
how does that show free will that doesn't really make sense as an argument at all
[QUOTE=HumanAbyss;43753354]how does that show free will that doesn't really make sense as an argument at all[/QUOTE] If they displayed free will they would not do what they were asked to by the guards. Eg, the guy who went on the hunger strike. The others showed no free will by letting themselves be controlled by the guards... My 2 cents, take it leave it whatever.
If they displayed free will they wouldn't be in prison because they could walk through the walls or fly out of the gate. if they displayed limited will they'd have a part to play in putting themselves in that situation from the ontological perspective of guilt and responsibility. if they have no free will and are a cog in a wheel responsible for a negative action then they are where they belong for the time being. I don't think free will can be shown through anyones actions in relations to anyone elses. Free will, to me, needs to be shown in the brain in the most simplistic of senses. Two solutions are created in the brain, and the brain picks one over the other through it's own decision. However, I doubt this happens as the reaction comes down to chemical processes at the end of the day and may be impossible to determine, but most definitely follows the rules of the universe around it.
[QUOTE=HumanAbyss;43753428]If they displayed free will they wouldn't be in prison because they could walk through the walls or fly out of the gate. if they displayed limited will they'd have a part to play in putting themselves in that situation from the ontological perspective of guilt and responsibility. if they have no free will and are a cog in a wheel responsible for a negative action then they are where they belong for the time being. I don't think free will can be shown through anyones actions in relations to anyone elses. Free will, to me, needs to be shown in the brain in the most simplistic of senses. Two solutions are created in the brain, and the brain picks one over the other through it's own decision. However, I doubt this happens as the reaction comes down to chemical processes at the end of the day and may be impossible to determine, but most definitely follows the rules of the universe around it.[/QUOTE] So free will must be magical in order for it to exist? Is that basically what you are saying?
Yeah pretty much That or we prove that these indeteriminates you speak of are up to a personal choice which is a claim that is unproven
[QUOTE=Zenreon117;43752465]For the same reason you can say the universe is infinite, but particles are not. Properties don't always scale, particles can't have free will just as surely as humans can't be down-spin or up-spin or positive or negative. Properties are given to the systems at the scale which it makes sense to apply them at. I will ask you what I asked earlier; Define "I". (What is personal identity, where does it start, where does it end?)[/QUOTE] I think the self is an illusion, so the answer would be that it doesn't start anywhere.
[QUOTE=HumanAbyss;43754253]Yeah pretty much That or we prove that these indeteriminates you speak of are up to a personal choice which is a claim that is unproven[/QUOTE] This is what I mean though, you are being non-sensical. You are defining free will as something that is impossible by definition. Secondly, if those indeterminates are part of you, then how is it not you choosing? They are producing indeterminate action within you, and that IS YOU.
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