• If you die but have an exact clone are you dead?
    310 replies, posted
Yes and no? Your clone would be a separate copy of you. Your consciousness would end and your clone would live doing things as you would normally do.
No. The clone is not you. [highlight](User was banned for this post ("Section rules - Don't state your position with no argument" - JohnnyMo1))[/highlight]
You do not share consciousness with your clone, In the movie The Island is a pretty good concept for clones they are the same person exactly but they are there own person in there head. So when you die, its not like your consciousness will transfer to your clone.
That's a really nice question you have there. If you can see things what you see, you can probably see 2 views! Amazing. Now your clone can go to vacation and you can go to other places like cold lands expect warm lands.
Define you You: Your unique consciousness that cannot be carried over just by copying yourself You: Your personality and history that CAN be copied and carried over to another cloe Yes and no. Following the first definition, you as in the "first" would cease to experiment the world and therefore die. Following the second definition, your personality, idea and memories would survive and go on to develop.
[QUOTE=MasterFen006;45505221]No. The clone is not you. [highlight](User was banned for this post ("Section rules - Don't state your position with no argument" - JohnnyMo1))[/highlight][/QUOTE] But it has the same memories as you, and is (the same as) you in each and every way. So I would argue that the clone is, in fact, you.
Okay so for instance, What makes me, ME, would be my body and my consciousness that would be all. Now if I had a clone, it would not be the original, this is true. But even if I knew I died in my previous body I would still be myself, same body same mind.
I subscribe to the belief that you are nothing more than the atoms you are comprised of, and thus if a perfect atom by atom replication was created and the original destroyed, it's irrelevant if my original physical being is gone, because from my perspective I will simply blink and appear in a different location. I wouldn't give a shit if my old atoms are gone because I would still be myself, same body, same mind, same everything. It seems so simple and logical. You step into clone machine>current state is recorded>vaporized>state is printed out and state is resumed from where it left off as if nothing happened.
what if it's a Rykar - transporter situation? Two exact copies are made but separate from one another There is no "original", they're both exactly the same. But assuming one is the original and dies, even then, you aren't dead not are you not dead. You pretty much become quantumly both alive and dead. You died, that's 100% certain, but you're still alive through an exact replica, so you died but are not dead. what about a Lt. Data sitation? (major spoilers) [sp]Data dies however his memories are transmitted to b4, and eventually b4's brain is improved to that if not better of what Data's was, and acts exactly as data did[/sp] this technically doesn't count however as it counts as [sp]Resurrection[/sp]
[QUOTE=Smashmaster;36881435]Consciousness is inseparable from the brain. Think about it this way. After the clone is made, it has a separate consciousness from the original. By definition, since it can act, think, talk, and feel just like the original could, it has a consciousness. At this point, clone divergence has already begun. Since the clone is in a separate physical position than the original, it's already accumulating separate, mutually exclusive experiences. However, if the original dies, how exactly does it's consciousness come to 'join' the clone's? How can one brain have room for two consciousnesses? Do they jam into the same brain like sardines? How do two sets of mutually exclusive memories unify? Which consciousness gets control of the body? So, clearly, if the brain dies, the consciousness dies right along with it. That's the only way that makes sense, and doesn't lead to a bunch of paradoxes.[/QUOTE] But paradoxes still appear. The "consciousness" is not something that actually physically exists, it's a [b]subjective[/b] product of brain functioning ([i]I and only I can truly know that I exist and am self-aware; to make judgment on whether anyone else is self-aware, I have to go by evidence of their activity and compare it to myself, same rules apply to me for any third party observer[/i]). It doesn't go anywhere, it doesn't "join" anything. For all intents and purposes, your exact clone is you. Everything that constitutes your ME (I), your memory, mental image, all the connections between neurons etc. - is the same for the clone in the exact moment "original" brain no longer functions, and "copy" brain starts functioning. It's you. Now, the interesting part is having an exact clone of yourself if you are still alive. That's interesting, and is the biggest and worst paradox to even think about. Is the "consciousness" shared between two physical entities? Something inside me that masks itself as "logic" screams "NOOOOOOO, IT'S IMPOSSIBLE!", but then - how the fuck would I know, it hasn't ever happened and not really likely to happen any time in the closest future? Go away, pseudo-logic, we know fuck-all about subjective self-awareness, it's utterly unobservable at this point in time.
[QUOTE=gudman;45597402]Now, the interesting part is having an exact clone of yourself if you are still alive. That's interesting, and is the biggest and worst paradox to even think about. Is the "consciousness" shared between two physical entities? Something inside me that masks itself as "logic" screams "NOOOOOOO, IT'S IMPOSSIBLE!", but then - how the fuck would I know, it hasn't ever happened and not really likely to happen any time in the closest future? Go away, pseudo-logic, we know fuck-all about subjective self-awareness, it's utterly unobservable at this point in time.[/QUOTE] I'm not sure why there would be a paradox. At the point of cloning there are two instances of you, which diverge into having distinct mental states as they start perceiving different aspects of the environment. Both can equally claim to be you, and depending on your definition of self there should be no problem with declaring them as two branches of the same individual.
[QUOTE=Ziks;45597527]I'm not sure why there would be a paradox. At the point of cloning there are two instances of you, which diverge into having distinct mental states as they start perceiving different aspects of the environment. Both can equally claim to be you, and depending on your definition of self there should be no problem with declaring them as two branches of the same individual.[/QUOTE] It all comes down to what self-awareness is. Two instances of identical entities that are exactly the same would have exactly the same self-image, until it starts to differ based on different experience. It may not really be a paradox, yes, but it certainly is kind of hard to process. If you die prior to the clone's brain "activation", it can very well happen that you kinda blinked and appeared in a different place, because why not - your sense of self isn't separate from everything that constitutes your physical entity, and the clone (for obvious reasons) won't have memories of them/you dying. Effectively, you never really died. But if you are still alive, for a brief moment in time, everything that your consciousness and sense of self is "tied" to, exists in two instances. That may not be a logical paradox (because again, there's no reason to think that something's wrong there), but that's... weird.
depends on the continuity, while that clone is you, its not actually you its a seperate instance of you, so say we upload of you to a super-computer something or other, you will physically be here, your brain will still be running you, however a new instance of you.exe is now running on other hardware so take that a step further, you die, the other version of you is not you, its you' if you're not caring about continuity then yes, uploading a person as they die or clone them would make it you [editline]5th August 2014[/editline] assuming cloning in this case is a perfect 100% copy with the exact same consciousness
[QUOTE=Sableye;45600684]depends on the continuity, while that clone is you, its not actually you its a seperate instance of you, so say we upload of you to a super-computer something or other, you will physically be here, your brain will still be running you, however a new instance of you.exe is now running on other hardware so take that a step further, you die, the other version of you is not you, its you' if you're not caring about continuity then yes, uploading a person as they die or clone them would make it you [editline]5th August 2014[/editline] assuming cloning in this case is a perfect 100% copy with the exact same consciousness[/QUOTE] If you care about continuity you die when you sleep.
The difference is backward regression. Whereas the entity which is actually you can be traced back to your birth, the entity which is your clone can only be traced back to your death. These entities have different values insofar as they share the same environment. Given that one can exist without the other reveals a secondary difference. It seems that if your clone, whether your are alive or dead, is a seperate entity, then you have died insofar as the entity which traces directly back to your birth has ceased to exist.
[QUOTE=Zenreon117;45602242]The difference is backward regression. Whereas the entity which is actually you can be traced back to your birth, the entity which is your clone can only be traced back to your death. These entities have different values insofar as they share the same environment. Given that one can exist without the other reveals a secondary difference. It seems that if your clone, whether your are alive or dead, is a seperate entity, then you have died insofar as the entity which traces directly back to your birth has ceased to exist.[/QUOTE] But the entity that is not you can remember things from 4 or maybe 3 years after birth because it is you. Same cells everything so exactly the same that if you tried to trace its birth it would be traced to the original you. Because it is exactlt you, this feels like a paradox because and exact clone of an individual would have the same structure, the same roots of the individual.
[QUOTE=Zenreon117;45602242]The difference is backward regression. Whereas the entity which is actually you can be traced back to your birth, the entity which is your clone can only be traced back to your death. These entities have different values insofar as they share the same environment. Given that one can exist without the other reveals a secondary difference. It seems that if your clone, whether your are alive or dead, is a seperate entity, then you have died insofar as the entity which traces directly back to your birth has ceased to exist.[/QUOTE] Tracing back using which definition of identity? Quantum state? Same atoms? Positional coherence? Same subjective appearance? Coherent memories? Why should any of these objectively be the correct definition? Surely the only one that subjectively matters for an individual is that their memories can be coherently traced backwards, in which case both individuals after a cloning are equally branches of the same person.
[QUOTE=Ziks;45603653]Tracing back using which definition of identity? Quantum state? Same atoms? Positional coherence? Same subjective appearance? Coherent memories? Why should any of these objectively be the correct definition? Surely the only one that subjectively matters for an individual is that their memories can be coherently traced backwards, in which case both individuals after a cloning are equally branches of the same person.[/QUOTE] The difference being that one is a necessary result of your birth, and the other is unnecessary and while your birth is a necessary condition, it isn't sufficient.
[QUOTE=Zenreon117;45604140]The difference being that one is a necessary result of your birth, and the other is unnecessary and while your birth is a necessary condition, it isn't sufficient.[/QUOTE] Scenario You have two teleporters side by side. You step in one, and are teleported to the other. Nothing spectacular. But lets say the machine has a fault, and someone teleports themselves, but the location A, where they departed from, still a copy of you remains. No one knows which one of the subjects is the "real" one. There is no method you can use to determine who is original. They both share memories of the same life. The same memories. The same in every way. Do you suppose the clone has a memory of his "inception" that the "real" one wouldn't have?
[QUOTE=HumanAbyss;45604377]Scenario You have two teleporters side by side. You step in one, and are teleported to the other. Nothing spectacular. But lets say the machine has a fault, and someone teleports themselves, but the location A, where they departed from, still a copy of you remains. No one knows which one of the subjects is the "real" one. There is no method you can use to determine who is original. They both share memories of the same life. The same memories. The same in every way. Do you suppose the clone has a memory of his "inception" that the "real" one wouldn't have?[/QUOTE] No, but they would still be metaphysically different objects. ESPECIALLY if the original riker remains intact on the transporter pad. The one which was transported to the enterprise is not metaphysically neccesary whereas the riker on the planet is. That is to say that whereas the riker on the enterprise would only exist if they tried transporting him, the riker on the planet would exist regardless of that fact.
[QUOTE=Zenreon117;45606458]No, but they would still be metaphysically different objects. ESPECIALLY if the original riker remains intact on the transporter pad. The one which was transported to the enterprise is not metaphysically neccesary whereas the riker on the planet is. That is to say that whereas the riker on the enterprise would only exist if they tried transporting him, the riker on the planet would exist regardless of that fact.[/QUOTE] And how would you differentiate the two? The only way you know that they are different is the scenario of them being teleported in this fashion, had you not have heard about the teleportation nor seen it you would not know. Your best friend from 3rd grade gets beamed for instance and the result is a copy of your friend whereas the original was vaporized. Why would this friend act any different than before? Why would they have different memories. You couldnt possibly have a way of knowing.
[QUOTE=Itolkweed;45606649]And how would you differentiate the two? The only way you know that they are different is the scenario of them being teleported in this fashion, had you not have heard about the teleportation nor seen it you would not know. Your best friend from 3rd grade gets beamed for instance and the result is a copy of your friend whereas the original was vaporized. Why would this friend act any different than before? Why would they have different memories. You couldnt possibly have a way of knowing.[/QUOTE] Just because you print the same book twice, it doesn't mean you only have one book. Especially if one book ends with you being vaporised, and the other book adds past that point. How would you tell them apart given that you do not know about teleportation? I don't know, how would you tell two cars of same make model and color apart? Regardless of what you say, they are different cars, especially if one gets a cup holder later and the other one never does. [editline]5th August 2014[/editline] Practically; They are the same. Functionally;They are the same Metaphysically; They are not the same.
[QUOTE=HumanAbyss;45604377]Scenario You have two teleporters side by side. You step in one, and are teleported to the other. Nothing spectacular. But lets say the machine has a fault, and someone teleports themselves, but the location A, where they departed from, still a copy of you remains. No one knows which one of the subjects is the "real" one. There is no method you can use to determine who is original. They both share memories of the same life. The same memories. The same in every way. Do you suppose the clone has a memory of his "inception" that the "real" one wouldn't have?[/QUOTE] They have a family guy episode like that actually, stewie and brian used the teleporter to get to vegas and it malfunctioned and didnt teleport them... but it did. The originals so to speak, figured it didnt work and took a plane to vegas. the clones (im not sure if thats the right word in this case) were stoked about the teleporter working. Now both sets believed they were originals. this isnt how i base my point of views but i pretty much agree with how everything worked and its actually an interesting episode considering the topic of conversation. [editline]5th August 2014[/editline] [QUOTE=Zenreon117;45606716]Just because you print the same book twice, it doesn't mean you only have one book. Especially if one book ends with you being vaporised, and the other book adds past that point. How would you tell them apart given that you do not know about teleportation? I don't know, how would you tell two cars of same make model and color apart? Regardless of what you say, they are different cars, especially if one gets a cup holder later and the other one never does. [editline]5th August 2014[/editline] Practically; They are the same. Functionally;They are the same Metaphysically; They are not the same.[/QUOTE] Well comparing it to a car, prior to the vin numbers, having the same components inside and out same exact everything, i could literally steal your car and replace it with mine.. it would serve no purpose considering these cars are exact in every way But you would never know. Sure metaphysically they are 100% different, but wouldnt such a thing be more of a concept as there cant possibly be a way to tell the difference.
[QUOTE=Zenreon117;45606716]Just because you print the same book twice, it doesn't mean you only have one book. Especially if one book ends with you being vaporised, and the other book adds past that point. How would you tell them apart given that you do not know about teleportation? I don't know, how would you tell two cars of same make model and color apart? Regardless of what you say, they are different cars, especially if one gets a cup holder later and the other one never does. [editline]5th August 2014[/editline] Practically; They are the same. Functionally;They are the same Metaphysically; They are not the same.[/QUOTE] Metaphysically, both individuals after cloning are not the same as the individual that entered the cloning machine. Even the individual that we would classically call the "original" is now in a different quantum state to the person entering the machine because they have interacted with their environment. We can only subjectively say that the one coming out of the first pod is the "original", just as your belief that you are the same individual as the one that posted the post I am replying to a few hours ago is subjective. Personal identity is not objectively defined, so surely all that matters is that all individuals believe that their subjective identity has been maintained.
[QUOTE=Ziks;45607289]Metaphysically, both individuals after cloning are not the same as the individual that entered the cloning machine. Even the individual that we would classically call the "original" is now in a different quantum state to the person entering the machine because they have interacted with their environment. We can only subjectively say that the one coming out of the first pod is the "original", just as your belief that you are the same individual as the one that posted the post I am replying to a few hours ago is subjective. Personal identity is not objectively defined, so surely all that matters is that all individuals believe that their subjective identity has been maintained.[/QUOTE] Well then in that case, I could make a version of you that wasn't accurate, but so long as it says it identifies as you, then it can be the same person. Subjectively of course.
[QUOTE=Zenreon117;45607308]Well then in that case, I could make a version of you that wasn't accurate, but so long as it says it identifies as you, then it can be the same person. Subjectively of course.[/QUOTE] Yes, I'm fine with that although I might subjectively disagree with them depending on how extreme I perceive the inaccuracies to be.
[QUOTE=Ziks;45607325]Yes, I'm fine with that although I might subjectively disagree with them depending on how extreme I perceive the inaccuracies to be.[/QUOTE] Very well. I still contend that identity is a matter of tracing back to birth. All possible branches of me are still 'me' insofar as we all must have come from the event I refer to as my birth. Character is another matter. [editline]6th August 2014[/editline] In other words, being of natural birth is like being from a seed, where the information for you is inferred from the seed. However, being cloned or otherwise copied is being created from a set of information that is more whole and restricted. To be a clone is essentially to start your 'causality' tree to split into a new sapling.
[QUOTE=Zenreon117;45607480]Very well. I still contend that identity is a matter of tracing back to birth. All possible branches of me are still 'me' insofar as we all must have come from the event I refer to as my birth. Character is another matter. [editline]6th August 2014[/editline] In other words, being of natural birth is like being from a seed, where the information for you is inferred from the seed. However, being cloned or otherwise copied is being created from a set of information that is more whole and restricted. To be a clone is essentially to start your 'causality' tree to split into a new sapling.[/QUOTE] [QUOTE=Ziks;45603653]Tracing back using which definition of identity? Quantum state? Same atoms? Positional coherence? Same subjective appearance? Coherent memories? Why should any of these objectively be the correct definition?[/QUOTE]
I have a further question on to the original Say the clone is created as a result of someone killing the original. Was it still murder? I mean "you" are still alive, so is there a murder victim?
yes an instance of you was murdered
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