how do you know you're still the same consciousness after you wake up from deep anaesthesia, under which humans provably have no consciousness? lots of things fully interrupt consciousness. your argument is fine but you're not really in a position to make it because you're probably not even the original Newb
While one might lose consciousness, so to speak, I used the term, perhaps misleadingly, to refer to the unceasing continuation of the brain working - which anesthesia doesn't really stop.
Even in clinical death the brain continues (trying, in most cases with permanent consequences) to work. The thing supposedly giving rise to your consciousness doesn't cease until the moment you die as far as I know, unless I happen to be mistaken.
Yes, but it's not quite right to say that the consciousness is there just because the brain is working. When your computer hard hangs, is the software still working just because the fans are still spinning?
We know far less of the nature of streams of consciousness than we do that of an OS running on a computer to be making such comparisons so easily, which is where this skepticism of mine comes from.
Your comparison may well be appropriate, but given the knowledge we have now undergoing such procedures will be nothing short of a gamble.
A lot the talk about immortality is really just that, talk. The science behind the mind and more hasn't been going through some massive explosion but instead a few replicated studies have found our previous understandings were false and we've had to course correct which for people outside of those speheres sounds like massive progress.
Its not. We're no more closer to immortality as we are to a cure for Alzheimers. This doesn't mean we should going after such targets but the rate of discovery for new medications and medical techniques have been exponentially getting harder.
One such example is that every 9 years in the R&D world of medication development, the list of newly discovered drugs has been getting cut in half since the 1950s. Realistically, for all of us chatting right now, you will never see immortality and you will most likely not see our life expectancy go up. In fact with how the planet is going, its most likely going to go down.
Immortality would ruin the human species, IMO
It would halt our evolution both genetically and mentally
My only problem with the video is that everyone is freed from the dragon all at the same time equally.
When, in reality, it would likely be closer to the king paying the researchers find a way to make his friends, family and favored subjects be spared by the dragon while everyone else still goes off to be eaten for a long time. :V
All of this argumentation is completely worthless if you can't properly define what consciousness is in the first place.
People keep going in circles about us not properly understanding "consciousness", about it being a mystery, but nobody stops and wonders whether such a thing even exists in the first place.
You argue that the brain working continuously is important for you to remain "you". I don't see why it would be. Imagine that, in scenario A, your brain gets disintegrated during a femtosecond and then perfectly rebuilt, and in scenario B, nothing happens.
The end result is exactly the same in both scenarios, every single atom is exactly at the same place, everything's identical. Why, then, should it matter to you whether scenario A or B happens, if the result is exactly the same?
The only reason you would have to worry about it is if there was something immaterial, that's beyond our material plane, that defines our identity. In other words, a soul. Which is exactly what the concept of "consciousness" is, the religious concept of the soul masquerading as a secular, objective entity.
I have seen no evidence so far that such an immaterial entity exists. Thus I don't see why I'd worry about teleportation relying on temporal disintegration, or brain simulations occurring in a format that isn't constrained to my current brain.
In such a case, where the exact same atoms are put together in the exact same configuration as before, yeah, I fully agree there can be no conceivable difference.
Hardly is this the case in proposed scenarios of "uploading" a mind, where the process isn't just stopped and resumed, but the information of the process is copied over to another hardware.
I think of it this way: say, for instance, you were cloned, and the clone coexisted with you in the exact same time. It would be absurd to suggest you would experience being both of you because you happen to have the exact same configuration of hardware and software, so to speak, wouldn't it? Is this not the exact case with such a proposed scenario?
What does identity have to do with any of this? I fail to see how you got out of my words that some immaterial thing defines our identity. For what its worth, I believe identity - that is, the who that constitutes people, to be wholly defined by the material and the social.
I'm either misunderstanding you, you are misunderstanding me, or both.
First off, why would it being the exact same atoms matter? Atoms are indistinguishable from one another, as long as the structure is the same, it shouldn't make a difference.
Secondly, I don't think it being the exact same configuration matters too much either, as long as it's similar enough. Your brain structure constantly evolves, and you don't become a different person just by hitting your head on the corner of a table, even though it does alter your brain's atomic structure. Thus it shouldn't need to be perfectly identical, just a precise enough approximation.
As for your copying issue, I don't see how it is a problem, for the two aforementioned reason.
It would make a difference during the period of time where the two coexist, but not afterwards once one is destroyed.
If you do agree that being disintegrated and then later reconstructed using different atoms doesn't kill you in the end, then why would you being reconstructed a few nanoseconds before you're disintegrated make a difference afterwards?
It only starts mattering if the two individual start experiencing different events that are significant enough to alter their identity, and differentiate them.
I am not entirely certain on it not killing me, by which I do not mean it not killing Newb, the one who would write posts such as this - who would definitely live on after such a thing; Rather, the Newb that is currently experiencing writing this post.
Your example seems to suggest I'm not conveying what I personally mean by "the subjective consciousness" properly, as I am not concerned about whether the one acting in very clearly empirically demonstrated ways in the world is faithfully reconstructed or not.
Hmm, I guess it does sound a bit like the concept of some kind of material soul, doesn't it?
Well, since the two scenarios would be materially identical in the end, it would only make a difference to you if what makes you "you" is tied to something beyond the material realm.
So, not really a material soul, but rather an immaterial one that can permanently expire depending on material events.
I don't see any evidence of such a thing existing, thus I'm not concerned with it.
I originally thought this would either turn out the dragon was fnargl or capitalism, was a bit more disappointing.
You can never prove to me that a conscious self can be copied from the original host, so no, I wouldn't. Even accounting that I were on my death bed and there was nothing for me to lose, I don't want to become a philosophical zombie to others. That just seems disturbing and sad for everyone.
A "philosophical zombie"? What would such a copy lack that you don't?
The evidence is you. "I think, therefore I am."
How do you define the "ego self"? So far we only know of the nervous system's existence, we don't know anything about something separate from it existing. It's up to you to prove that there's something more to the individual than its material structure.
As for your question, yes. If by "cloning" you actually mean copying, that is.
Yourself. You. The person typing right now. That's you. If you die, assuming there is no afterlife, you cannot enjoy or do the things you do right now. If you were cloned, that would be doing things. Not you.
I can prove I have a self. I can't prove it for anyone else though. That's what the entire concept of a philosophical zombie is. What value is there in copying yourself if you don't get to actually enjoy being the copy? Unless you view it as we copy certain "useful" people for the greater of humanity, but that gets into really messy eugenics-esque issues.I'd rather such a thing be used to benefit everyone on a personal level than "deciding" who to clone. That's very grimdark and a bit too utilitarian.
Also I'm pretty sure most science would acknowledge consciousness exists. We just don't know how it works because we lack so much understanding of the human mind.
As much as I like Descartes for his work on mathematics and physics, I find his approach on philosophy to be lacking. How is that evidence of anything? Like, yeah, you think, so would a copy of yourself. Thinking is an entirely physical and chemical process, unless you prove the contrary.
How is it reductive to claim that it is nothing more than a material object? Yes, we don't know that it consists of more, all the more reason not to consider it does.
If your "conscious" (what is it?) was cut off entirely and permanently, you wouldn't be alive I guess. How is that what happens if you get copied though?
And what is the self if not the expression of the material state of the brain and body?
Didn't I argue with you about this once in WAYT
So, the material structure that composes me, then?
Baseless statement. If I am but a material structure, then a clone of myself would be me, too. Until we start experiencing different things that start setting us apart, that is.
If that's the case then surely you could give me a proper, precise, scientific definition of consciousness, along with evidence that it exists.
This is all silly considering we barely understand the brain in of itself and ontop of that the methods used for AI is actually the worst way to go about it.
Again, it seems to me you think I, and maybe also ThighHighSuccubi, base the "ego" or subjective consciousness in the (currently) objectively measurable qualities that make it so we can be told apart, like what we remember and how we have acted, when this is missing the entire point.
Nobody is denying that this copy would, to all observers, be you. The idea is, what of the you going through the subjective experience of being you? Is that one copied as well? Does this subjective you suddenly experience the sensation of being both the original and the copy? Or is the inner world, this emergent you which has the experience copied as well (meaning, of course, there is another one rather than it being the same one).
All this discussion is making clear to me is my inability to properly explain the concept I am trying to elaborate on, which is more of a failing on my part than on yours, as it is very clear you do not understand what I tried to say.
Care to explain?
Being human is not dictated by lifespan. Death is inevitable for all - but the aging process, if it could be slowed down, halted, or even reversed, is no more immoral than chemotherapy for a cancer patient.
We evolved to value our own and other's lives. No one is less than human for choosing to die, and no one is more than human for choosing to live. Our humanity is not dictated by how long we live, but how we treat others.
The way I think about it is like this:
I think I am the same person as I was an hour ago because I can remember being that person, and also because I believe I have a continuity of experiences between then and now. That's how I'm going to subjectively define continuity of personal identity over time, as I think that most closely matches my experience of feeling like I am a continuous entity.
If I am copied, both the "new" instance of me and the "original" leaving the scanner will remember being the pre-scan version of me, and will believe they have a continuous stream of experiences from before I enter the copying machine up until their current moment. From my perspective before entering the copying machine, I know both instances will remember being me, so I'm happy to say that they are both equal continuations of me.
If our conscious experience emerges from information processing, and is substrate independent, I can't find a good justification for claiming that one particular branch of a copied mind is the "real" one. Both instances, as information processing systems, are direct continuations of the pre-scanned mind. One had its current state propagated to it through electrons travelling through wires, while the other acquired its state through ions travelling down neurons. Assuming substrate independence, there would be no way for either mind to tell the difference.
From the perspective of the mind being scanned, I don't think you can assert that its experience only propagates to one resultant mind or the other. Maybe it's a mistake to think of its experience propagating into the future at all, even for minds not being copied. We are only aware of our past experiences, not our future ones, so there's no observation that can be made by any observer (even the ones being copied) that would assert that one specific person is the real continuation of a copied mind.
You're missing the point. I'm not saying that you are currently basing it on material considerations, I'm saying that you should.
Let's do it step by step to better illustrate my point:
There is currently no evidence whatsoever that something exist outside of the material realm. Thus the reasonable approach is to assume that all that matters is matter. Correct?
If all that matters is the material structure of things, then the aforementioned scenarios A and B can't be differentiated by anyone, including you. Because if you don't experience the end results in the exact same ways, then this means that there's something that makes you "you" that is dependent on something that's not from the material plane, something that, according to the previous point, has no evidence of existing. Correct?
Atoms are indistinguishable from one another. This means that whether you're rebuilt using the same atoms or different atoms in scenario A, it doesn't make a difference. Correct?
If none of these points are refutable, then we've established that if an exact copy of you is made after you're destroyed, the copy is you, even from your own point of view. Do you agree with this conclusion? If not, why?
Now, instead of assuming that your body is copied femtoseconds after you're destroyed, let's assume that it is copied femtoseconds before. Is it reasonable to believe this makes a significant difference? I don't see why it should. After all, the end result is still the exact same as before, so it shouldn't influence the decision of the "you" who decides to go through with the procedure. Do you have any objection to this reasoning?
Thus there's no demonstrable metaphysical conundrum based on the idea of a copy of you being created for small amounts of time before you're destroyed. The only issues would arise from a practical standpoint, for instance, if the period of time that passes between the two is long enough for the original and the copy to be significantly different.
Look at all these fucking pro-dragon cucks in this thread, smh
Are you actually sure though?
Like this is just largely empty theorizing, if you had the opportunity, why not just take it? You can always just shoot yourself if you don't like it 500 years down the line
If we're immortal, then accidental deaths will be much more tragic. Instead of losing ~80 years of life, you lose an infinite amount. I know monogamy and the current norm of having a few close family and friends through life probably wouldn't survive in a society with no aging, but those losses would stay with you forever. There's so many factors to consider in a society like that it's mind boggling.
I never spoke of a "real" or a "fake" consciousness, only original and otherwise. Whether this other me has a delusion of originality for the fact he shares all his physical and mental characteristics with me or not is irrelevant for the fact I will only experience being myself, and he will experience being himself and remember experiencing being me in the past. That neither of us would be able to tell if they're the original is of no real consequence.
Can you measure qualia, which are both a consequence of the material and in a way separate from it? Would you say qualia do not exist and are an artefact of flawed models of viewing reality, then?
If your answer is that qualia do not truly exist, then the answer is no, if your answer is that qualia is not separate from the material - then I have to agree. The dispute in this point is almost entirely semantic - based on what you decide to consider material.
Correct. Only that, in my view, it is not a thing outside of the material that makes you "you", but rather a thing in the material which by its subjective nature we cannot currently measure physically. That such scenarios are indistinguishable for any observer has no bearing on my point.
This very well may be true, or it might not. How can you tell with certainty that it is the same subjective experience continuously existing, or just a perfect copy of it?
With all this what I am trying to say is we currently have no way to physically measure in any meaningful empirical way that not only there is a self going through subjective experience in this brain and body you call Newb - but that it is the same one as before. Without having the possibility of definite answer to such questions, how can you possibly say with absolute certainty that it is a non-issue? How could I possibly posit otherwise?
This metaphysical (for now) conundrum still stands, it seems to me, for if it is a delusion, at least unlike those of theology it perpetually regenerates itself by way of me continuing to experience the sensation of the present.
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