Where have I spoken of measuring anything? You can't measure both the speed and position of a particle, that doesn't mean that either of those parameters don't exist.
Whether we can measure what you call "qualia" is irrelevant. It has no bearing on whether it is matter-based or from some other plane.
Your statement is contradictory. You claim that it is "in" the material (and thus an objective thing) but not measurable because it's subjective. It can't be both.
Because there is no material difference between the two. If you argue that it isn't the same subjective experience, then that means that subjective experiences depend on something else than the material world, a claim there is absolutely no evidence for.
And why wouldn't it be the same as before? The material conditions are exactly the same. What makes you think it would be different, except for your willingness to doubt?
Because I have never seen anything that could indicate that the self depends on anything other than the material world and the structure that composes an individual.
That's like asking "how can you possibly say with absolute certainty that there is no god?" There's no way to prove there isn't one, but there isn't anything that indicates that a god may exist either. It's possible, but very improbable. It's much more likely that there isn't one.
Likewise, I'm about as worried about my "self" not transferring over to my teleported copy as I am about the possibility of there being a teapot between Earth and Mars.
I'm using "real" as a shorthand for the one that you'd claim has the genuine continuity with the pre-copied consciousness. I'm suggesting that we don't really have a justification for assuming that the other mind is deluded in thinking it is a continuation of you, I think it has the exact same claim as the mind exiting the scanner. To be honest, I suspect the idea that there's a single continuous self is just an intuition we have that helps us reason about the world, and doesn't correspond to anything objectively real. There's no observation that can be made to prove that you're not just being copied, annihilated and replaced with a copy every minute, so I think there's probably not an objective distinction between the experience of that happening vs not happening.
I'm not saying it is by definition empirically unobservable (as that would be a supposition I have no real grounds to make - I do not presume to know what possibilities future technologies will afford us) but rather it is by definition subjective, that is, pertaining to the experience of a specific conscious object we call a human. Why can't a subjective experience have objective existence in the world? I'm almost certain this is yet again one of those cases where language fails me in conveying what I mean.
How does that in any way suggest an immaterial grounding for subjective experience? All I'm saying is I don't see how it is somehow less likely that a material continuity is required for a mental continuity, rather than a new subjective experience absolutely identical yet separate? Am I failing to demonstrate to you that being physically identical in qualities of content does not mean it somehow occupies the exact same space and time as the original, meaning it is still separate?
Would you look at two atomically identical cups and claim they are the same object?
I'm not saying it isn't the same as before in this example, which indeed I have no grounds or experience to claim, but entertaining the possibility of such a thing and demonstrating our inability of even currently answering such questions empirically. It is precisely doubt I am demonstrating, as we have no grounds to reduce the subjective to just what is, with our current tools, observable.
God is a bad analogy, as it posits at its least a necessary by definition metaphysical First Cause (that we can claim metaphysical necessities based on physically derived rules of thumb is absurd), or at its worst a whole framework of fixed ideas based on nothing but faith and twisting all evidence to confirm it. Even here I fail to see how you would claim likelihoods of things by definition unknowable (not to claim that the subjective experience is by definition unknowable, we can't know that for sure).
When its possibly your existence on the line hanging on the statement about the existence of a teapot between Earth and Mars, metaphorically speaking, I'd rather be somewhat certain before embarking.
A suspicion I share, but would not risk things like momentary annihilation and instantaneous reconstitution for just yet.
I guess I see what you mean. Either way, if the subjective experience in question has objective existence in the world, then all that matters for the subjective experience to be the same is that the objective world be the same.
Continuity, mental or material, doesn't matter because a given material state has no memory of the states that preceded it. If both scenarios result in identical states, then the choice of scenario doesn't matter because after that point, there will be no difference in terms of experience for you. The only period of time where it matters is the one where neither you or your copy exists, or both of you exist. That period of time doesn't matter afterwards so long as those scenarios result in the same material state as nothing happening.
So basically, what matters to you or any other person is the present which you experience, differences in the past are irrelevant for a given present state.
If two structurally identical objects coexist, they are not the same object. If one of the objects disappear afterwards, it doesn't make a material difference to an alternate scenario where the original object simply moved. If there's no material difference, there's no subjective difference for a live copied object, because subjective experience is based on material reality. Thus it doesn't matter.
But to say that two identical material states might yield different subjective experiences requires that subjective experiences be based on something that is not material. Sure, it may be, but I don't see any indication of that being the case. As a result, I don't think it's likely.
The likelihood of things by definition unknowable can be gauged by how specific you hypothetical scenario is. It is, by definition, less likely that a god named Yull who dresses up as a clown and likes strawberry cake created the universe than it is likely for a non-specific entity to be at the origin of it.
Similarly, I find it more likely that consciousness and subjective experiences are an emergent property of our material, observable world, than a property that supersedes our present material state and depends on past states, even given an identical present state. The belief that requires to make the least baseless hypotheses is the most likely to be true.
This is by definition true for both anybody observing the person who was copied and the emergent subjective experience of the copied person himself, but would it be true for the "original"?
Would he not, just as before, continue experiencing himself alone even as the copy does the same for itself? If so, how is this copy not a separate living thing with a separate, albeit identical, subjective experience? And if we grant all this, how would annihilation of the original and instant creation of the copy not be, for all intents and purposes, death for the original, despite any observer including the "new" person believing nobody "died"?
As stated above, there being absolutely no difference for the "me" that is the copy does not necessitate "me", by which I mean this particular subjective experience, being present, rather than an identical one.
Again, not different, separate. They would be as identical as the two cups, but as separate as the fact you can clearly tell that there are two cups rather than one.
While this rule of thumb of least suppositions is a great heuristic for gauging likelihood of everyday occurrences, it depends solely on the observation that most things that happen do not have particularly complex causes. It is a logical shortcut, but has no necessary bearing on truth-value of a given untested (in this case untestable) statement. To speak of likelihoods of the metaphysical is to suppose it functions in a manner similar to the physical, which by definition is not a thing you have grounds to suppose.
Besides, in the case of worldly religions it is much easier to doubt the material conduits of supposed divinity than the existence, or lack thereof, of said divinity. I mean, how could a physical being with no avenue to experience the metaphysical world he supposes to describe be capable of describing what is there?
You would squander any hope we have of escaping old age and natural death because you think that to avoid it we would need to stop being human. You chain of logic to inhumanity is stupid and your belief in what makes us human is also stupid.
There's a massive non-sequitur between the new "you" being indistinguishable from the orignal to itself and everyone else, to it being irrelevant to the "you" undergoing the procedure. I'd say for the original, there is absolutely no difference between being replaced with an exact copy at the exact same instance, being replaced with a slightly different copy, being replaced a thousand years later, being replaced with a different person, a dog, or a table. I find it absolutely bizarre that your side is always the one that brings up "souls" when it's you who seems to imply some sort of body surfing/quantum immortality.
While I agree with him that one might become something other than human had we the ability to escape biological mortality, what I find troublesome is his seeming worship of the status quo, as if the current mortal human is somehow intrinsically more valuable than these somewhat altered potential humans who would last longer and possibly know and remember more.
Again, you're introducing a variable that has no reason of existing, some sort of invisible tag that differentiates the original with the copy beyond its material structure.
There's no reason to believe such a tag exists. If there's no difference in end material state between the two possibilities, it doesn't make a difference for the person making the choice. I haven't seen you refute that point.
It's just logic, either all that matters is the material, or there's something that's not material that doesn't get carried over to the copy. The history that lead to the two strictly identical material states is irrelevant.
Separate material worlds? I wasn't talking about two copies being present simultaneously, by identical material states I was referring to the two scenarios from the beginning.
If two scenarios that result in the exact same material state for the world result in different subjective experiences for you, it means that subjective experiences are based on something other than the material world. You have to refute this if you want your point to be proven. I honestly don't see how my statement can be called into question.
Except it is, like with most things in the world it is simply more probable, until proven otherwise, that unknown things function in the same way as known things do. That's the basis of all science. If you don't apply this principle, you quickly fall into Russel's teapot territory.
On the contrary, you're the one that's assuming there's something to transfer between the two bodies for someone to keep being themselves. I'm saying there's nothing but bodies, anything else is irrelevant.
Before I further try to elaborate on my point I want to know your definition so I can work with it, what do you define as material?
But I'm not saying the two scenarios result in a different subjective experience for me, but rather that they might create a new me that would have these identical subjective experiences.
If I'm understanding you correctly by what you mean as material, my point is based entirely in the material world. If not, then that will be revealed by you answering the above question.
It seems to me you read my points as if I speak with certainty rather than entertaining a possibility, by the way, which isn't my intention. It is your certainty I doubt, though.
Given that science deals with the falsifiable and the physical, to attempt to apply it to what we cannot by definition empirically test, as it lies forever outside the physical, seems fruitless.
A smarter move would be to merely doubt all claims of metaphysical truth for their being absolutely groundless.
Could it be you assert it is more probable without proof (for indeed what proof can you bring forward to things such as this?), and shift the burden of disproof on others? Would be somewhat ironic, if it is so.
Fair enough, I mean physical, that is composed of matter.
I'm not sure I understand, is the distinction you're making here purely semantic? Because I don't see why it would be another "you" if the physical state is the exact same as if you were not copied. Again, that would only be the case if something was not properly transferred during the copy.
I don't see what there is to doubt about it, really. I see no indication that there's something beyond our physical existence that makes us ourselves.
We might not be able to falsify the metaphysical, but probability rules still apply to it regardless of whether we can verify their accuracy.
I have nothing metaphysical to prove. My claim is that our individuality is nothing but a result of the physical. It is your claim that there might be more to it than that, thus you're the one who is bringing the metaphysical and unfalsifiable to the table.
I too have a nagging fear that this argument is devolving into pure semantics, but that's a roadblock we'll have to get over if we want to properly understand each other, at any rate.
Is it even possible to describe consciousness itself, an emergent property of the physical structure of the brain, in physical terms?
Keep in mind I don't mean how certain parts of the brain result in certain behaviors; I speak of the sensation of existing. Can you describe this in purely physical terms?
It is for this reason I'm not sure we speak of the same thing when we speak of "individuality" and "originality". Why would the particular sensation of existing that I experience right now be transferred, rather than a new one created? Is that not supposing less baseless hypotheticals than the former?
To the latter point (which I took as not really connected to this main argument as its just an issue I had with what you said earlier, but you putting them together has some tangential relevance to my point, so I can't blame you for doing that) why do probability rules apply to things one cannot at all either experience or interact?
Unlike Russel's teapot, which is a thing that is clearly falsifiable just currently unfeasible to test, one cannot look into the metaphysical to find God. So to speak of probability rules applying in the metaphysical is to make claims as to how the metaphysical operates, in essence not different from asserting the existence of a deity out there, or platonic forms.
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